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Abstract
The paper seeks to explain state failures. To do so, we focus on non-market forms of interactions 
in the public sector that allow officials to move into high or low effort levels, a kind of state ten-
dency to bipolarity or manic depression. The activity level actually ’chosen’ will have important 
consequences for the overall non-state economy. The paper outlines reasons why low effort and 
high corruption levels are likely to go together and increase the risks for possible rise in violent 
conflicts. It further describes mechanisms that show how non-formal institutions may impact cor-
ruption, state activity levels and possible economic gains from joining violent rebellion. 
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A. Introduction 
State failures are partly characterized by an inability of the state to 
supply the citizens with a minimum of public output and services, and 
partly by a rise in violent rebel organizations. In the following I will in 
an informal manner analyse some of the mechanisms that make a pub-
lic bureaucracy shift its activity level and thereby its supply of public 
output, and outline some of the interaction potential between devel-
opments in the state bureaucracy and voluntary, violent collective ac-
tion. 
 
Our explanations will to some degree shadow Bates et al. (2002) by 
distinguishing between lethargic, violent and productive equilibriums. 
But the lethargy is rooted in the public sector and the focus will be on 
the interactions between the regular individuals that populate the bu-
reaucracy and the violence-wielding organizations. The organizations 
that populate most existing models that seek to explain the coexistence 
of state failures (fiscal crises) and violent rebellions (such as in Bates 
et al. (2002) or Azam (2008)) are perfectly centralized. Any organiza-
tional output relies, however, on the cooperation of a large number of 
individuals. If the apparatus is not there, a politician can do nothing, 
not even steal, nor may a rebel initiate any violent action. Our focus 
here then will be on the individuals who populate the public bureauc-
racies and the (potential) violent rebel organizations.  
 
Most of the time I will assume, as do Bates and Azam, that some kind 
of economic motivation is a main driver. Hence, corruption will be 
part of the story. At the same time I will point to phenomena that are 
difficult to explain with that motivation narrowly interpreted. Regard-
ing the behaviour in public bureaucracies, we assume that most of the 
time effort levels are sufficiently low to make task-solving motivation 
important.1 Among regular economic motivating factors we empha-
size the prospects for promotion.  
 
The paper starts out by presenting a mechanism that allows a bureauc-
racy to move (for simplicity) just into two effort equilibriums, one 
‘high’ and another ‘low’. While a bureaucracy may be partitioned into 
several parts with a fairly low degree of interaction (and therefore may 
contain sub-apparatuses that have adjusted to different effort levels), a 
state bureaucracy is sufficiently centralized to make effort levels 
                                                 
1  Beyond a certain effort level, increasing marginal disutility of effort will set in, as is the 
regular assumption in most economics models. 
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likely to spill over from one part to another most of the time. Effort 
levels at the higher rings are, of course, exceptionally important. The 
bipolarity mechanism outlined here may not be compatible with the 
dominating principal-agent models applied when analysing bureaucra-
cies in many situations. This is not only because of the utility function 
suggested above, but even more by the way information is spread and 
shared in the public apparatuses. Given the importance of the princi-
pal-agent models for most economics explanations of organizational 
behaviour, I will sketch some of the points of contention.2  
 
Following Kornai (1971), we assume that almost any ‘real’ activity, 
input or output, is shadowed by some informational input or output. 
Some activity units, particularly within public administration, produce 
information only. Monitoring, whether mutual, as among agents in 
any real activity centre, or specialized, as in a public auditing unit, is 
an important part of the information gathering. With low-activity lev-
els, less information gathering and less effective monitoring are taking 
place. Hence it becomes easier to get away with rule-breaking behav-
iour, such as corruption. The public structure fragments and the single 
official may ‘corner’ his decision field for private purposes, at the 
same time as the expected value of punishment for rule breaking de-
creases.  
 
We then look at the interaction between public bureaucracies and or-
ganizations outside the bureaucracy. In the first case we look at or-
ganizations where an individual public official in principle may be a 
member: a private company, an aid-financed NGO, a political party or 
a kin-based organization. Such outside membership may increase the 
alternative costs of making hard efforts as a public official. If widely 
spread, such organizations may pull the bureaucracy into a low effort 
equilibrium. Membership in organizations that have direct influence 
on promotion and employment processes, such as kin-based organiza-
tions or political parties, may have an exceptionally strong effect. Ac-
tivity levels here are mainly competitive to the activity level in public 
organizations. 
 
We then look at the relationship with the regular private sector econ-
omy when public officials are not private sector members. Here we 
point mainly to complementary mechanisms. They may work in both 
directions: Increased private output increases tax income, that may, 
for example,feed public promotion ladders, public sector average 
wage levels or in other ways boost public sector morale and contribute 
to increasing effort levels. On the other hand, increased public output 
                                                 
2  This does not imply any general criticism of principal-agent models that clearly are useful 
in many situations. Since they are so important for economists’ thinking in this field, it is 
helpful for the understanding of our assumptions to relate them to the ruling ones. 
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or service supply will tend to increase private sector output. Increased 
efforts among customs officials or better public port infrastructure 
may significantly reduce private sector transport costs and increase its 
output (Sequeira and Djankov 2009), as will of course better public 
roads or rails. In some cases we have increasing returns in private and 
public sector effort levels. Increased efforts among students increase 
the effects of increased teacher efforts. Together they increase the 
public supply of educational output. There are, of course, competitive 
relations too: In the final analysis, domestic resources and output are 
finite and will have to be divided between the private and public sec-
tors (and the foreign sectors). It is also well established in economic 
research that in a number of situations a partial increase in tax rates 
will cause decrease in private sector activity levels. Presumably, more 
eager tax officials that are able to collect more taxes from a given set 
of rates may partially have similar effects, although such increased 
efforts will normally go together with general productivity increases 
in the private sector. 
 
We finally look at the interaction between the public sector and the 
potential prevalence of anti-government violent organizations. To do 
so, we look at both the internal interactions in the public sector and its 
direct forms of interactions with the formal private sector. But a key 
mechanism linking state behaviour and the formation of rebel organi-
zations is the strength and character of informal organizations of 
which the kin-based ones appear to be the most important. 
B. Public organizations and state failure 
While the main aim of this paper is to sketch a kind of general equilib-
rium model of GDP levels, corruption frequencies and conflict prob-
abilities, its most original and disputable part is likely to be its analy-
sis of the behaviour of officials in the public sector. Hence, most of 
the analytic efforts will be expended here. Most of the empirical evi-
dence alluded to will also refer to bureaucratic behaviour in the public 
sector. Like the theoretical analysis, the empirical evidence will be 
presented in an exploratory, informal manner.  
  
The supply of and upkeep of public output or service, as well as the 
implementation of any kind of public rule or law, demand some kind 
of action by a public bureaucracy. If that is missing, the public outputs 
will not be forthcoming and the laws will not bind. Hence the issue of 
how public bureaucracies work, is crucial in determining whether a 
state is failing or not. The important role of working public bureaucra-
cies for the overall economic output has been demonstrated empiri-
cally in Evans and Rauch (1999). Nevertheless, the role of bureauc-
racy has often receded into the background when state failures are dis-
cussed. In Rotberg’s (2004: 7) catalogue of state failure characteris-
tics, the specifics of bureaucracy behaviour are mentioned only once: 
‘The bureaucracy has long ago lost its sense of responsibility and ex-
ists solely to carry out the orders of the executive and, in petty ways, 
to oppress citizens.’ In Bates’ analyses (2008a, 2008b, Bates et al. 
2002) that explore the same terrain as we cover here – the interaction 
between the behaviour of the state and the behaviour of violent, organ-
ized rebel groups – the collective action problems on the parts of both 
bureaucracy and rebels are assumed solved so that all the organized 
parties may be considered as centrally directed (Bates 2008a: 16). 
 
In economic analyses, the state’s modes of operation have most of the 
time been assumed given or exogenous. Its capacity to supply public 
goods and services has mainly been determined by long-run and slow-
ly moving factors such as the competence levels of the public employ-
ees. Hicks' (1969:12-13) view that the long-run equilibriums of public 
bureaucracies are at low – but essentially stable – activity levels has 
been, I believe, widely shared. In the short run it is considered con-
strained by public expenditure decisions or its capacity to borrow and 
tax. 
 
Hicks also pointed out, however, that when a society needs to accom-
plish some exceptionally large tasks extraordinarily fast, such as wars or 
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large rescue operations, public organizations would be asked to solve 
them. Somehow there appears to be built in some capacity for short-run 
expansion in the way public apparatuses work. Apparently, public or-
ganizations may operate at widely different activity levels even at a 
given distribution of competence and education levels.3 There has to be 
considerable slack. The steep decline of production in the former Soviet 
Union – all production was organized by public bureaucracies – has on 
the other hand revealed the downward capability of public bureaucracies 
when exposed to shocks.  
 
At present, most countries possess a stock of educated labour power to 
populate a state apparatus with sufficient competence for it to perform 
its major tasks. Nevertheless, the performance often appears to be far 
below its capability, sometimes so far that outside observers judge it as 
‘failed’. How to explain this?  
1. Fragile activity levels in public bureaucracies? A bootstrap 
theory 
Let us assume that a typical public employee’s utility function is indi-
vidualistic and defined over the set of tasks she encounters4: 
 
 U = U (pT, w, e, õ),     (1) 
 + + - ? 
where U is a utility measure, p is the probability of solving the task, T 
a measure of the size of the task, w the wage level and e is an indica-
tion of the bureaucrat’s own effort level, õ, an index of the other task-
solving bureaucrats’ efforts. To solve a task increases the utility as 
does an increased wage level; increased own ‘efforts’ reduces it, while 
the effect of õ may be undecided. 
 
The solution of the task can in general not be accomplished by a single 
official alone, however, so the probability of success also hinges upon 
and increases with the efforts of the other members of the task group. 
That increases the typical official’s utility. But the direct effect of in-
creased efforts of the others, õ, hinges upon the characteristics of the bu-
reaucratic process itself, and becomes, of course, more involved than the 
formulation of (1) may suggest. I will not develop a formal theory here, 
but it will have to involve a system of equations where the wage level 
has to be decomposed into the value of expected promotion and existing 
wage. The wage (through the expected value of promotion) may then be 
                                                 
3  When Evans and Rauch (1999) found that the degree of ‘Weberianness’ had strong im-
pact on growth, they had adjusted for levels of higher education. There the ‘Weberian-
ness’ indicator reflected the degree to which merit and long-run employment contracts 
were emphasized in the main public bureaucracies.  
4  To state the obvious: (1) is not to be understood as a rigorous mathematical function, but 
simply as a mnemonic device. 
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considered to be a function of the probability of successful task solving, 
own efforts compared to others’ efforts, non-public sector wages and so 
on. 
 
The transaction technology of the public apparatus is characterized by 
the fact that most transactions inside a bureaucracy have low monetary 
costs, they are almost free, but at the same time forced.5 That is, you 
may not refuse to engage in communication with other officials who 
have the right to communicate with you. That applies in both directions 
in a hierarchy as well as in some pre-specified horizontal links. Orders in 
particular are supposed to be obeyed, not bargained and haggled over, as 
long as the apparatus is working. The low cost of transacting implies that 
if few other officials are sending messages for you to respond to, you 
will have little work to do. If many are contacting you, it may be dif-
ficult to refuse to get involved with the actual tasks. The transaction 
technology of public organizations then functions much like an assem-
bly line (Akerlof 1976), although public officials, if cooperating, have a 
much larger scope for pretending to work than a worker on the assembly 
line.  
 
While orders and other forms of pure information may be sent directly 
across several hierarchic layers without any direct interaction between 
the officials, the actual execution of tasks presupposes direct interaction 
between officials, often belonging to different steps in the hierarchic 
ladder.6 Since any state is centralized, we may assume that there exists a 
path that connects the interactions between any set of public employees. 
Hence, any shock that hits one part of the state apparatus may impact the 
whole mass of interactions between public officials, but shocks that are 
hitting the apex are likely to spread faster. 
 
If we for simplicity assume i) that officials may either choose to be 
committed to solving a task or not, ii) any task solution involves at least 
two officials, drawn randomly from the population of state officials, we 
will expect a committed official on average to prefer to engage another 
committed official, and a non-committed to engage another non-com-
mitted one. The (expected) utility of the choice of being committed will 
increase with the size of the (perceived) fraction of the population who 
are committed.  
 
We may add a number of reasons why this is likely to be the most com-
mon situation: If you have chosen a non-commitment strategy and you 
                                                 
5  In some New Public Management systems, where sub-units are supposed to estimate their 
‘unit’ costs and cover the value of the units delivered to other sub-units through charges, 
this may not longer be wholly true.  
6  This implies that interaction between officials in public organizations has many of the 
characteristics of so-called ‘non-market interactions’ (cf. Glaeser and Scheinkman 2003) 
that have received much attention in econometrics and mathematical economics recently. 
Our discussion will be wholly informal, however. 
Jens Chr. Andvig 12 
have to engage with a committed official in the execution of a task, you 
will be revealed to her as lazy. You may then risk harassment and non-
promotion in case she is a superior. On the other hand, if you choose to 
be committed, the subjective costs of working hard are lower if the other 
who is engaged in doing it is also committed. Moreover, in the frequent 
situations where there are complementarities in work input and also in-
creasing returns, both the probability of solving the tasks well and the 
value of the tasks resolved per unit of time in (1) will increase. In this 
case the prospects for promotion, in case she is a superior, will increase. 
If she is non-committed, on the other hand, the subjective costs of efforts 
will increase, task output will decrease and the impact on possible pro-
motion will be uncertain. 
 
These mechanisms are reinforced if we somewhat accessorily look at the 
choices in a wider setting. Note that the number of tasks that arrive to 
any pair of task solvers will depend on the average rate of task comple-
tion (cf. Akerlof’s assembly line metaphor). If you then as a non-
committer join another one, your pair will clog up the line, harassment is 
likely and the prospects of promotion dim. On the other hand, if every-
one else is working slowly and you happen to be in an ‘energetic’ pair, 
few tasks will arrive, and your output will stall in the next pair. In fact, 
little will be accomplished. Your bureaucratic surroundings are likely to 
be annoyed and exceptional efforts may even have negative impact on 
the probability of promotion. 
 
Summing up, it is plausible7 then that two similar state bureaucracies 
where the officials possess the same average level of formal competence 
in the aggregate may behave in widely different manners. The state may 
show symptoms of a bipolar disorder. The situation can be illustrated in 
the following simple ‘Schelling diagram’ (Schelling, 1973): 
 
  
                                                 
7  Since the preference constellation is not formally fully specified above, the argument is 
somewhat loose. One specification of the situation will be as a ‘battle of the sexes’ game, 
but other less symmetric specifications are also possible. Similar situations have been ana-
lysed for corruption by Sah (1989, 2005). An analysis and specification of utility distribu-
tions in the actual situation outlined above have been presented in Andvig and Moene 
(1993).  
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Figure 1:  Simple bipolarity
b’
H’
S’
On the horizontal axis we have the fraction of hard-working, or com-
mitted, officials, H, ranging from 0 to 1. By implication, the fraction 
of slow workers, 1 – H, is ranging from 1 to 0. Depending on the spe-
cific interpretation of the diagram, the fraction may represent the ac-
tual or perceived fractions. On the vertical curve we have the expected 
utility of officials. The S-curve indicates the expected utility of the 
slow choice for the last official making a choice for the whole range 
of possible mixture of hard and slow workers. The H-curve indicates 
similarly utility for the hard working choice given the possible frac-
tions. In line with our assumptions that officials like to meet like-
minded ones, S is decreasing and H increasing as the fraction of 
committed officials increases. 
 
There are three equilibrium situations: a, where all officials choose to 
go slow, c where all will work hard, and b where it does not matter 
what you choose. The first two situations are stable, that is, if anyone 
by chance makes the ‘wrong’ choice, no one is tempted to follow. The 
b-equilibrium is unstable, however. Given that mixture, if one addi-
tional official starts to work hard, everyone will in the end be doing 
so. If one more starts to work slowly, on the other hand, the state ap-
paratus will slide down to the a-equilibrium. 
 
Some of our assumptions may be regarded as rather artificial, particu-
larly when combined. For example, it appears somewhat artificial to 
make the agents decide on effort levels before they make a task and 
not coordinate them afterwards when the preferences are defined over 
a set of tasks. Here we may reformulate the bureaucratic game in an 
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evolutionary direction, however, where we start out with a distribution 
of committed and non-committed bureaucratic ‘types’ where the num-
ber of the type with the highest expected payoff will increase. We may 
then get another interpretation, but basically the same result as the one 
outlined in diagram 1.8  
 
Let us note that we at the outset allow officials at different hierarchic 
levels to participate in solving the same task. Hence the analysis is not 
based on the kind of asymmetric information assumed in principal-
agent games that have become dominant in the economics approach to 
the study of bureaucracies (cf. Dixit, 2006).  
 
To better grasp the implications of the theory sketched in diagram 1, 
let us look at the adjustment in the case where an external shock to the 
relative rewards of commitment takes place – for example due to a 
shift in political leadership. The dashed lines indicate the new reward 
lines.9 If the shift takes place when the public apparatus is already in 
a- or c-equilibrium the officials’ behaviour will not shift except in 
cases where the shocks are exceptionally large, but their utility levels 
will.  
 
If the initial situation is not in equilibrium, and I will not expect it to 
be since any state apparatus is likely to be in a process of adaptation to 
former shocks, the consequences of the shift will be more significant. 
For example, if the initial mixture of committed and non-committed 
officials was between b and b’, the public sector will shift direction 
after the political shock. While it before would move towards the 
slow, ‘soft’ – state equilibrium of non-action, the mixture would now 
move towards the fast, ‘hard’ – state equilibrium. We may also note 
that the same set of bureaucratic reforms may give none or large ef-
fects depending on the initial situation. The same applies, of course, 
with negative shifts in the hard effort utilities. If the initial situation 
was in b’ or between b and b’ with b as the new unstable equilibrium, 
the public apparatus would then slide down to the low effort equilib-
rium – the final outcome may become a state of state ‘failure’. 
2. Principal- agent models and the bipolar state  
Our model of the state produces an exceptionally high degree of fra-
gility in effort levels. It is a caricature, but highlights some mecha-
nisms I believe are important. To some degree we have disregarded 
some of the hierarchic features of public organization when we look at 
the aggregate behaviour of state officials as determined as their non-
                                                 
8  For a textbook exposition of a couple of evolutionary games useful for studying our boot-
strap game, see Chapter 2 in Bowles (2004). 
9  The S- and H-curves are not independent, so an upward shift in the H-curve would nor-
mally demand a downward shift in the S-curve, given our assumptions. 
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market interactions. Hierarchy has simply been regarded as a set of 
technological restraints that channel otherwise voluntary, ‘non-market 
interactions’. This may be somewhat naïve. How does it depart from 
more commonly accepted economics approaches?  
  
The dominant approach to economic behaviour inside hierarchies has 
been the principal-agent games. The main situation studied is when a 
committed superior (a principal) meets a lower-ranked non-committed 
employee and develops the lowest cost incentive scheme in the situa-
tion, modelled so that the agent may choose to become hard-working 
(or non-corrupt) after all, while still willing to stay employed. Note 
then that the fragility theory predicts that most encounters of members 
in hierarchic organizations are either when both are committed or non-
committed while the typical encounter in principal- agent games is 
between a committed and a non-committed. By implication that 
should also be the most frequent one if the principal-agent theories are 
the most appropriate. 
 
The most obvious, head-on difference is to be found in the underlying 
preference structure, however: If meeting a committed principal, an 
agent would then actually prefer to work hard according to our the-
ory.10 No specific incentive scheme to induce work efforts in the situa-
tion should be necessary. The reason for choosing the hard-work strat-
egy when the principal is hard working, would according to our line of 
reasoning partly be that the subjective labour costs will be lower and 
the prospects of promotion would be higher, a very strong motiva-
tional drive in most formal organizations.11  
 
Not only is the motivational structure different, so is the informational 
structure too. In principal-agent games, the agent possesses informa-
tion unavailable to the principal that the agent may manipulate to the 
disadvantage of the principal. In the task-focused model of a bipolar 
                                                 
10  Let Vij ( h , s) be the utility of official i when she meets the slow official j where h is the 
hard-working and s, the slow-working strategy. In Andvig and Moene (1993), where a 
number of activity equilibria were outlined, we assumed i) Vij(h h) P Vij(h s), ii) Vij(ss) P 
Vij(sh), iii)Vij(ss) P Vij (h,s) and iv) Vij(hh) P Vij(sh) where P means ‘is preferred to’. If 
i is an agent and j is a principal, we see how iv) breaks with the principal-agent assump-
tions. The agent here will prefer to work hard when meeting a hard-working superior. 
Note that the ranking here is not complete, i.e. I have not stated whether Vij(hh) P Vij(ss) 
or the other way around. In Andvig and Moene (1993), we assumed that v) Vij(ss ) P 
Vij(hh) if we included the subjective disutility of harder effort for agent i in the Vij(hh). 
There are, of course, a number of situations where Vij(h s) P Vij(hh): in bureaucratic bat-
tles or in rent-seeking contests (which have become more common in New Public Man-
agement structures) it is better to meet a lazy than a hard-working contender, but within 
the same unit this is more exceptional.. 
11  Note that we in diagram 1 assume that the typical bureaucrat does not hit an effort level 
where increasing marginal disutility sets in, although with our assumptions the effort level 
has to increase when the fraction of committed officials increases. To adjust to increasing 
marginal utility of effort as the bureaucracy increases its share of hard workers, we could 
make the H-curve decline when the fraction of committed officials passes a certain thres-
hold. This would not shift the equilibrium, however, as long as the H-curve is above the 
S-curve when h = 1. 
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state, officials at different hierarchic levels participate in the solution 
of the same task. Hence the information is not in general distributed 
asymmetrically across the hierarchic layers. The combination of in-
formed principals and the possible prevalence of committed agents 
may be considered naïve; that we cut away the main problems of hier-
archic organizations. Nevertheless, it may fit many situations better 
than the more cynical view of agents’ behaviour in the principal- 
agent models. 
 
Moreover, in some of the situations we have in mind, where the states 
are hardly functioning, it is equally naïve to assume that they are po-
pulated with committed, hard-working principals. In such public or-
ganizations, the payoffs of officials in positions as principals (i.e. in 
disciplining positions) may only be remotely related to the efforts of 
agents. Hence their incentives for making efforts to create and imple-
ment incentive schemes that may induce efforts from their inferiors 
are likely to vary with the overall ‘drive’ in the public apparatus. The-
refore, to make the principals’ behaviour reasonable they should par-
ticipate in some high effort equilibrium among themselves. But then, 
why should the agents’ behaviour be different? 
3. Modification of the bipolar model: Heterogeneous officials 
The equilibrium outcome that all state officials are either committed 
or non-committed is of course too extreme. It is partly built on the un-
realistic assumption that all officials are equal. With heterogeneous 
individuals, the fast and slow equilibriums may be composed of mixed 
populations of committed and non-committed individuals. 
 
In Andvig and Moene (1993) we assumed that some of the subjective 
costs that the officials experienced when choosing the hard-working 
or committed strategy were independent of whether they performed a 
task together with a committed or non-committed individual. These 
costs were distributed in a bell-shaped way across individuals, that is, 
most individuals were clustered around a typical subjective cost level. 
We were thinking of effort costs then. If they were not too high, stable 
high and low effort equilibriums would again arise, but they would 
both be mixed with individuals choosing the opposite strategy. It is 
reasonable to assume that at least some of these costs are independent 
of the other agents’ behaviour. 
 
For our problem – to elucidate mechanisms that may cause a state to 
‘fail’ – a different interpretation of effort or commitment costs may be 
useful. One may consider the costs associated with choosing the high 
effort strategy with respect to labour input to the formal state appara-
tus to be the alternative costs of not engaging fully in competing non-
State Bipolarity, Kin Organizations and Violent Collective Action  17 
state activities.12 In this case too, we may assume that costs are uni-
modally distributed across officials where individuals are clustered 
around some typical costs. Presumably, these activities may to some 
degree be combined with formal state positions at the same time as 
they compete with their proper execution. The alternative costs may 
either be due to non-participation in outside-the-state networks such as 
political parties, close or distant family networks or a host of collec-
tive action groups. Moreover, the alternative costs may be missing in-
vestment efforts in preparing for employment in non-governmental 
organizations. 
 
An additional advantage of emphasizing the distribution of alternative 
costs to commitment is that it allows more convincingly for a larger 
vari-ation in cost levels across countries than pure subjective, quasi-
phy-siological effort costs do. Again, if the level of these costs is not 
too high, we will be led to a situation outlined in the following dia-
gram: 
 
 Figure 2. Bipolar state with internal equilibriums 
a
b
c
D
S
0 1ye
y D’
D’’
 
                                                 
12  While it is somewhat simplistic in this context, as a first approximation we may assume 
that all activities an official does in a kinship context are ‘unproductive’, and all efforts 
inside the public apparatuses are ‘productive’. Formal modelling of the consequences of 
this division of activities between productive and unproductive ones under a number of 
different incentive systems was presented in Haavelmo (1950). A brief English exposition 
may be found in Thalberg (1987). The initial inspiration is Pareto (1971, original English 
translation is from 1927). 
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The actual fraction of committed officials, y, is given on the vertical 
axis and the expected fraction of committed officials held by the offi-
cials, ye , is given on the horizontal axis. The S-line indicates the po-
tential equilibrium positions where the expected and actual fractions 
are equal. The starting point is a D-curve that yields bipolarity. Here, 
a is the stable low-commitment equilibrium, c the stable high-
commitment equilibrium, while b is the unstable one. Since the D-
curve is below the S-curve between a and b, it means that fewer offi-
cials than the actual number want to work hard (since they are pessi-
mistic about the likelihood of meeting committed partners) and the 
actual number slides down. Between b and c we have the opposite si-
tuation and the number of committed officials increases. This is like 
the situation outlined in figure 1, but if the fraction dips below a we 
reach officials who have so low-commitment costs that it more than 
compensates for the low prospects of meeting other hard-working of-
ficials in that situation. Above c we are in the opposite situation: offi-
cials who have so high effort costs that they will prefer to stay non-
committed even in (hypothetical) environments composed mostly of 
hard workers. 
 
The D’’-curve indicates a situation where the alternative costs to 
commitment have decreased so much for the various individuals that 
there is only one stable equilibrium; one where all officials are com-
mitted. The D’-curve reflects a situation where the alternative costs 
have increased so much that all officials are going slow. Note that un-
like the hard core of the pure subjective labour costs, the alternative 
costs of effort in formal organizations for each official will not be in-
dependent of the distribution of the other officials’ alternative costs. 
4. The role of structure: Cross-task and inter-temporary is-
sues and incentives 
The high activity equilibrium, c, in figure 2 relied on the assumption 
that officials had decided on their activity level before they met their 
task partner. The reason why most officials will stick to their high ac-
tivity choice there is that the probability of meeting a partner that has 
made the same commitment is so high that it does not pay to choose 
the low-activity commitment in the hope of meeting a partner having 
made the same choice.  
 
It may, however, appear somewhat unrealistic to assume pre-
commitment in this context. One may rather expect that the task part-
ners may adjust their behaviour to that of their partners. This opens up 
for the possibility that the equilibrium may be invaded by officials fol-
lowing an opportunistic strategy; that is a strategy where the official 
chooses a high activity strategy if she meets a partner that works hard 
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and a slow activity strategy if meeting a slow working partner. This 
strategy should dominate the alternatives. Compared with the pre-
committed high activity she gains in case she meets a low-activity 
partner, and compared to the low-activity strategy she gains when 
meeting a fast worker. 
 
Let us now imagine that we stay in the c-equilibrium reached through 
the pre-committed strategies and the effort costs of the agents are dis-
tributed in a bell-shaped way, but now some agents are allowed to fol-
low an opportunistic strategy and adjust to their partner’s behaviour. 
All of those who meet a slow-working partner have now no reason to 
change strategy since only people with high effort costs will choose to 
work slowly in this situation. But some, who have pre-committed to 
high activity levels despite fairly high effort costs because of the high 
expected probability of meeting a hard-working official, may now try 
to test out a slow-working strategy and the c-equilibrium will now 
tend to slide downwards to the left.13 
 
Does this mean that the hard-working equilibriums are without practi-
cal or theoretical interest? There are at least two ways to ‘save’ the 
high effort equilibrium. One is when effort costs are not crucial. This 
may happen either because the efforts are not in any case so high that 
increasing marginal disutility of efforts kicks in whether it is because 
the subjective costs of efforts as such are low or because of the lack of 
importance of kin or political party networks. That is, the c -
equilibrium may either be relevant when it may be reached without 
the officials driving themselves into effort levels where increasing 
marginal disutility of effort sets in, or it may only be reachable in 
countries where the alternative costs of efforts in the formal sector in 
terms of income (goodwill) foregone in kinship or political networks 
are not too high. 
 
Another way to see whether c- like equilibrium may be stable is to 
complicate the tasks so that they may no longer be solved by bilateral 
matchings of officials. That is, if it is reached, it may stick due to a 
number of structural features. What we have in mind here is not the 
formal structure of the state as such. That is surprisingly similar eve-
rywhere, but the fact that any task group is embedded in a larger struc-
ture. This structure makes it difficult for a small group of officials to 
make a mutual adjustment of effort levels without coordinating their 
actions with outside groups. For example, let us regard a situation 
where all officials at the outset follow a hard-working strategy except 
for the co-worker sharing the task with the opportunist, who has a 
                                                 
13  With the strong assumption v) about effort costs as described in footnote 9, Andvig and 
Moene (1993) showed that the fast-working equilibrium would not be stable. Only the 
slow-working one would be so. 
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high disutility of effort. This pair should then follow a low-effort stra-
tegy. If they do so in a higheffort structure, they are, however, likely 
to be penalized.. 
 
In the preceding, we have argued that in task-based interactions be-
tween public officials where officials at different levels of the hierar-
chy participate, the key information that may be manipulated is not 
between the bureaucratic layers, but across tasks. Whether an official 
tends to be linked to the same task over time or not becomes signifi-
cant. Likewise, it becomes significant whether his task group will 
communicate with other task groups for prolonged periods of time. 
Most public organizations are characterized by long multi-period in-
teractions between the same officials. This implies that his choice of 
non-commitment when meeting another non-committed is likely to be 
registered. 
 
When both officials sharing a task are non-committed, this is likely to 
be quite visible to neighbouring task groups, when the environment is 
composed of high commitment units that deliver input to or input 
from the task group. In this setting it is more reasonable to fix a strat-
egy for a number of periods and not to respond immediately with low 
activity if the other chooses to stay uncommitted for that single period.  
 
The importance of the promotion, demotion, hiring and firing strate-
gies becomes more visible in this multi-period setting. While wage 
rates are quite fixed and may rarely be used to elicit desirable behav-
iour, these strategies are important in determining the officials’ life-
time earnings. The combination of long-time (often life-time) em-
ployment and wage levels tied to a promotion ladder makes the com-
bination of promotion, demotion, hiring and firing strategies a strong 
brew of incentives. For example, while firing may be rare in most 
public organizations, perceived risks of being fired may nevertheless 
have strong effect because its effects on the long-term employment 
contracts. 
 
While we so far have assumed that the effects of the choice of strate-
gies by the officials that engage in task-determined meetings are 
symmetrical, it is clear that only a subset of officials has the power to 
fire, promote, demote and recruit. Their choices will have effects on a 
larger number of officials and an even larger number of task comple-
tions. If the distribution of committed and non-committed officials in 
this subset is the same as for the whole population of officials and 
they prefer other officials to have the same degree of commitment as 
themselves, their interaction with officials without employment pow-
ers will yield the same aggregate result as before.  
 
State Bipolarity, Kin Organizations and Violent Collective Action  21 
But here we have found a lever that may move a state apparatus to-
wards low or high achievement equilibriums in more ‘economical’ 
ways: the criteria of hiring, firing, promotion and demotion that are 
actually applied by officials with employment power. In addition to 
influencing the behaviour of the officials where leaders engage di-
rectly in their task solving, the centralization of the state implies that 
information about their behaviour tends to propagate quickly through 
the public apparatuses, and may modify behaviour widely. Still, a shift 
of top leaders from a non-committed to a committed team may not be 
sufficient to turn any low-activity equilibrium of a state apparatus. In-
ter alia, any new leadership must be expected to last and be able to 
supply a sufficient number of new promotion and job opportunities 
based on effort-inducing criteria: Will commitment and ability to ac-
tually solve the tasks the officials get engaged in as officials pay off in 
the long run?  
 
When interpreting figure 2 and the shifts in the D-curve, the key alter-
native costs to commitment strategies that shape the shifts will now 
pertain to the officials with employment power. That is, what are the 
costs for your standing in outside-the- state relationships if you ruth-
lessly base your promotion decisions on the basis of achievements or 
standing of the promoted officials within the set of public organiza-
tions? Clearly, these too are likely to vary considerably across coun-
tries. I will return to factors that are likely to impact their variation. 
5. Kin organization, foreign aid and state commitment 
The negative effects of outside commitments on effort levels may be-
come very strong in cases where the employment function in practice 
is located outside the state. In most cases this happens when kin-based 
organizations are exceptionally important in the political system or in 
the organization of other forms of collective actions. They may consist 
in tribal networks (Kenya), in more ad hoc ‘clans’ (Azerbaijan) or in 
political parties, seemingly formal but in practice based on personal-
ized neighbourhood, friendship or network structures. 
 
Thus, kin organizations are not the only informal way the employment 
function may be located outside the public sector. Formal political 
parties without strong kin-based selection of leadership may in prac-
tice also become deeply involved in the employment and promotion 
practices in the public sector, as we know from the Scandinavian 
countries. Anders (2005) describes how even foreign and international 
aid organizations have set deep marks on the employment and promo-
tion practices of the public bureaucracies in Malawi. 
 
Jens Chr. Andvig 22 
One reason for the overall expected negative effects on effort levels of 
such practices is that the outside agencies will have less immediate 
interest in their agents’ behaviour inside than outside the frame of the 
public apparatuses. The resulting loss of internal control and weaken-
ing of internal positive spillovers in activity levels make it easier for 
officials at all levels to get involved in non-state economic activities 
and move the employment function outside the public apparatuses. A 
driver may be employed at the ministry not so much for his driving 
skills, but because of his extensive up-state market network useful for 
selling the pharmacy products from the shop of a higher official’s 
wife. External distractions may have similar effects on the bilateral 
task matchings between officials at the same hierarchic levels. How 
negative the effects of any outside allocation of the employment func-
tion become, may of course vary with the character of the outside or-
ganization.  
 
Note that unlike direct, subjective costs of efforts as such, the alterna-
tive costs of high efforts made by any official within the formal frame 
of the state in terms of value lost due to his resulting lower efforts ex-
pended within the kin organization, political party, and so on, will be 
more strongly influenced by what the other public officials are doing. 
14 Presumably, the more efforts the other officials expend within kin 
or party organizations, the higher will be the alternative costs of only 
expending efforts within the formal state framework.15 
6. Asymmetric effects of downwards and upward shifts in 
state activity? 
So far I have assumed that upwards and downwards shifts in activity 
levels are rather symmetric. It simply means that public officials shift 
effort levels with respect to an undifferentiated mass of tasks. Being 
undifferentiated, there is no reason why we should expect anything 
but symmetry when average efforts move up or down. 
 
Let us now distinguish between pure information output and the rest. 
In his book Anti-equilibrium (1971), Janos Kornai makes an attempt 
to construct a language that could be applied to describe any economy 
in- and outside equilibrium;16 from a fully centralized planning econ-
omy to a fully-fledged market economy together with a multitude of 
                                                 
14  A moving literary description of increasing alternative costs of staying committed is Ar-
mah’s novel The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born (1968) from Ghana. Here his family is 
increasingly blaming the hero’s honesty as his colleagues work less and increase their cor-
ruptly acquired income. 
15  Taking this into figure 1, it means that both the H and S curves will be steeper, and the 
distance between them at h = 0 should be wider.  
16  Kornai, together with the most theoretically versed economists at the time, recognized that 
economic theory did not present really satisfactory analyses of market economies outside 
equilibrium. 
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other organizational mixes without bringing in any non-scientific 
ideological connotations. Few have adopted his language, but among 
its interesting features it proposed a duality characterizing any eco-
nomic organization or system of organizations (such as the state). In 
Kornai’s language they should all be divided into a control sphere and 
a sphere of ‘real’ processes. The control sphere was mainly producing, 
processing, transmitting and storing information, while in the real 
sphere economic goods and services were made, consumed, stored 
and transported and so on. Any real process or activity was controlled 
in the control sphere  
 
While not fully adopting Kornai’s language, let us note that in any 
matching made for any deliberate task solving, additional information 
about the characteristics and motivations of the agents and tacit infor-
mation about the nature of the task are likely to be collected in the 
matching. The characteristics of this information often make it diffi-
cult to convey or to be gathered by outsiders without considerable in-
formation loss. It is a case of Hayek’s tacit information. This is par-
ticularly the case when the agents involved themselves want to hide 
this information. The most efficient monitoring of agents’ behaviour is 
then the mutual one by agents doing tasks jointly and their neighbour-
ing groups. As the activity levels and the corresponding rates of task 
completion vary in the government, so will this joint product of in-
formation emissions.  
 
 To the degree superiors do not get involved in sharing tasks with their 
inferiors or the number of tasks per unit of time is reduced, they will 
suffer a direct information loss. Since a significant share of activities 
in an organization consists in pure information activities (or control 
processes in Kornai’s terminology); any variation in activity rates is 
also likely to impact the size and precision of information streams.17 
In low-activity equilibriums this causes additional loss of control by 
the superiors. A low- activity level state is likely to be difficult to ma-
nage. The mutual monitoring of public employees as public agents is 
weakened. Moreover, the upwards and downwards transmission of 
information streams is a precondition for keeping a hierarchy alive.  
 
Hence, if a state moves towards low-activity equilibrium, the control 
activities will weaken, partly due to a slackening of the rate of com-
pletion of control and information tasks proper, partly as a side prod-
uct of the general slackening. This implies that both horizontal and 
vertical information streams become sparser. In particular, even com-
                                                 
17  Particularly in high effort equilibriums, control sphere activities may crowd out activities 
in the real sphere, as can be observed in many New Public Management systems. This has 
been an important feature of public health, school , research, defence and police admini-
stration in Norway. 
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mitted officials with employment power will be unable to base their 
decisions on merit. They will not know.  
 
The state fragments, and will not be able to react quickly and in a gen-
eral way on central signals about any potential increase in the ex-
pected utility of high commitment choices. The different sub-units 
may respond quite differently. Hence we should expect upwards shifts 
in state activity levels to be slower and more fragmented than the 
downwards movements, but the prevalence of a formal hierarchy of 
decision-makers with employment powers at any modern state pre-
sents a lever that to some extent may speed up eventual movements 
out of low-activity equilibrium on a broader scale.  
7. Activity spillovers between different state agencies 
The distinction between control/information and output-oriented tasks 
is still rather abstract and general. Disregarding the arrangements at 
the political level, any modern state is in practice divided into a sur-
prisingly similar set of agencies assigned with comparable tasks and 
aims across countries, but often with varying average rates of com-
mitments among their employees.18 Some agencies’ effort levels are 
likely to have much stronger impact on the other public organizations, 
however, and some are clearly more important than others for the un-
derlying issue we address: the interaction between the behaviour of 
the state and the eventual rise in violent collective action groups. 
 
Political leadership institutions are likely to be the ones with the 
strongest spill-over effects, as we have already indicated. Politicians 
have the top formal employment power.19 Their own degree of com-
mitment is displayed in direct interactions with other public officials 
and the criteria they apply when employing, firing, promoting or de-
moting top bureaucrats impact most public organizations. But their 
behaviour also sends signals directly to lower order officials through 
rumours and media stories. Shocks at the political level may then 
change the direction in the whole state apparatus. Since the set of po-
litical institutions and the politicians’ behaviour –particularly their 
shifts towards predatory behaviour – have received great emphasis in 
recent research when explaining state breakdowns, 20 I will not pursue 
the matter here. We may just note that any of the politicians’ capacity 
to do anything deliberate, whether good or evil, is limited by the ca-
                                                 
18  In Andvig and Moene (1993), we also studied the interaction between two arbitrary agen-
cies with different distributions of effort costs, but then abstractly. They could have been 
any kind of agency.  
19  Note that unlike regular bureaucrats, politicians are supposed to interact with a host of 
non-formal organizations in rather unspecified manners. 
20  Researchers like Robert Bates (2008 a,b), Paul Collier (2009) and Buena de Mesquita 
(2005) have all emphasized characteristics of top level political games when explaining 
state breakdowns.  
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pacity of public organizations. To destroy that capacity, intentionally 
or not, may sometimes have more harmful consequences than any de-
liberate predation. It is variation in that capacity that is the theme here 
and despite the obvious importance of political predation, I will try to 
look at public bureaucracies as much in isolation from the political 
institutions as possible. 
 
Tax authorities and the central internal monitoring institutions such 
as the state auditors are otherwise the institutions with the most obvi-
ous spillovers. Let us consider the distribution of tax resistance capa-
bilities (and strength in motivation) in the population as given.21 For 
any such distribution a tax administration in high- activity equilibrium 
would be able to collect more taxes than in a state of low equilibrium. 
To sustain any overall high-activity equilibrium outside the tax ad-
ministration the state will need a sufficient tax income and a transmis-
sion process of it so that the state is able to pay regular salaries to its 
public officials. This will normally demand: 
 
1) Committed tax officials and officials in the associated administra-
tions. If the tax income is not sufficient and/or the loss during its 
transmission is too large to pay regular salaries22, the individual 
costs of staying committed increases for the officials all over the 
state apparatus.  
2) Apart from committed auditors, it will require that politicians do 
not interfere with the transmission and skim off too large 
amounts.23  
 
From the point of view of avoiding the low-activity equilibrium it is 
vital that the economic value of employment power should not be un-
dermined. This implies not only that the state’s revenue is sufficient to 
pay acceptable wages, but that it is able to keep up the economic value 
of promotions and have a sufficient number of promotion and em-
ployment slots available. With a sufficient number of valuable promo-
tions slots open and tied to efforts, the incentive effect is strong.  
 
                                                 
21  The resistance capability is not equally distributed across groups and countries. It is af-
fected by many other factors including tax rates, the set of institutions in the private sector 
and the economic policy it is exposed to..  
22  The potential problem here may be illustrated with the famous study on leakage in 
Uganda, made by Reinikka and Svensson (2006). They found that 87% of the capitation 
grants for non-wage expenditures to a sample of schools disappeared on their way through 
the public sector. Expenditures meant for teachers’ salaries were not skimmed off to the 
same extent, though.  
23  The main contributors to the leakages described by Reinikka and Svensson (2006) were in 
fact politicians at somewhat lower levels. In developing countries with extensive poverty, 
public revenues are one of the few sources of income that is large enough – due to its cen-
tralization – to make anyone really rich if he diverts sufficient amounts of it. The tempta-
tion is obvious. Collier and O’Connell (2008) refer to a number of episodes where high 
level African politicians – with examples from Kenya, Nigeria and Chad – have illegally 
skimmed off such amounts that they have had significant effects on state behaviour and 
growth.  
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Corruption in tax administrations (which should include customs in 
countries where civil wars tend to arise) is an important reason for in-
sufficient public revenue as is embezzlement in the transmission from 
collection to intended endpoints of funds. We will return to further 
impacts of corruption on state activity levels and on the opening up for 
the rise of non-state violent organizations.  
 
What happens in case sufficient public revenue does not reach its in-
tended salary payment destinations? Obviously, the alternative cost of 
staying committed will increase. In figure 2, the D-curve will move 
downwards. The impact on activity levels will depend on the size of 
the shift and the location of the initial equilibrium. If the state was in 
low-activity equilibrium the effect would be modest, as would the ef-
fect from high-activity equilibrium be, given that the shift is suffi-
ciently small. If, on the other hand, the shift induces a movement from 
high to low-activity (or commitment) equilibrium, the effect on state 
behaviour will be strong. 
 
What will the officials do? In order to keep up their accustomed stan-
dard of living they may now either spend more time on non-state ac-
tivities, or they may, where possible, do their own private taxation, 
that is, collect bribes or exert extortion.24 The movement towards ef-
fective fragmentation of the state will then be reinforced. 
 
Note that this process will be influenced by the effective income ex-
pectations of the public officials. Hence, non-sustainable income ex-
pectations may prove extraordinarily expensive in a poor country 
through their effects on effort levels.  
8. Variation in state agencies’ effort levels and the state’s 
exposure to civil war risks  
A key characteristic of a state that has ‘failed’ is that it has lost its abi-
lity to physically control some significant share of its recognized geo-
graphical space. Competing, potentially hostile organizations arise 
that may have capabilities to apply violent means in an organized way 
to control parts of that space.25 Let us disregard the impact state poli-
cies may have on the strength of grudges against the state and their 
relative occurrence in the population, and look at more technical mat-
                                                 
24  There probably is an element of private taxation in most forms of petty corruption in poor 
countries. Weber Abramo (2008) found that petty corruption as registered through house-
hold questionnaires practically disappeared in countries with GDP/capita above 10 000$. 
25  Most countries have some smaller pockets, typically, urban slum areas that are partially 
controlled by violent organizations such as youth gangs or organized crime units, mafias. 
In addition, more beneficiary organizations may operate outside the boundaries of the au-
thorities’ control and be, in the main, self-policed: some monasteries and some farming 
communities composed of members of religious sects or secular utopian organizations. 
The social and geographical spaces considered here are obviously too insignificant to cha-
racterize the state’s overall degree of spatial control, however.  
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ters that may strengthen the state’s physical and effective control of a 
given area.  
  
The first condition is that the state must possess sufficient information 
about the population and its activities in order to effectively police the 
area: knowing the issues that may trigger violent collective actions, 
the possible loci for rebellion, and eventually to be able to identify, 
locate and possibly punish or ‘bribe’ potential leaders. The second is 
to possess sufficient violent means to win any likely violent contest 
whatever the size and efficiency of the rebel or violent crime organi-
zation.  
 
The police and military are of course key when it comes to legally ap-
ply the violent instruments for control, but for the first task of collect-
ing information a large number of public institutions are involved. 
Here, as elsewhere, most of the monitoring made by the public offi-
cials is done simultaneously with their task solving. Let us consider 
the role of the primary schools. They constitute the backbone of the 
state apparatus in most low-income countries, particularly in rural ar-
eas, where most rebellions are likely to emerge. In addition to their 
teaching, committed teachers will collect information about their stu-
dents’ family situations. Teachers may be checking their identity or in 
fact give them identity in the many areas where systematic birth regis-
tration in fact is almost absent. The schools will be aware of most of 
the activities taking place in their communities whether there are local 
famines, or impassable roads due to local floods – active teachers will 
somehow bring the information to the appropriate authorities. Teach-
ers at secondary schools may also observe nuclei of rebel groups, po-
tential rebel leaders or ethnic tensions at their schools.  
 
On the other hand, teachers may also become practically absentee of-
ficials carrying out almost none of their assigned tasks, and local 
schools may disintegrate into shadow institutions. The consequence is 
that the state in practice withdraws from these communities. This 
withdrawal will often be linked to the general low activity– high cor-
ruption equilibriums of the state. One major reason for teacher ab-
sence will be financial spillovers from the tax administration: that wa-
ges may not have been disbursed either due to a slow disbursal proc-
ess, lack of means due to corrupt and/or slow tax collectors, or the 
teachers’ wages may simply have been embezzled. In any case, the 
teacher may have to go to the relevant administrative town and stay 
there for a while to speed up the disbursal of, or to recover the stolen, 
wages.26  
                                                 
26  The teachers’ political loyalty may in the worse case (for the government) switch from the 
government to the rebels. If so, they will naturally not do any informal monitoring of their 
neighbourhoods for the government. The importance of such switches for the progression 
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Let us now take a look at the organizations directly involved in secu-
rity, the police and the military. Compared to other public bureaucra-
cies, a distinguishing characteristic of the activities of the police in 
both peaceful and more violent settings is their spatial focus, and how 
they are operating in a quite unstructured bureaucratic environment. 
They are supposed to respond to situations as they occur or search for 
breaches of the law at their own initiative. Normally, the police do not 
have to wait for informational inputs from other parts of the admini-
stration, only from the public. So there are few direct activity spill-
overs to the police from the rest of the bureaucracy; while there are 
some from the police to the courts and prison administrations. Moni-
toring the many different forms of crime implies some kind of (weak) 
control of space.  
 
Most of the monitoring of the non-state environment that is performed 
by the police takes place as a consequence of its regular task solving: 
chasing criminals, crime scene investigations and so forth. Compared 
to other bureaucracies, they thereby gain a more fine-masked knowl-
edge of the location of a wide set of behaviours across space, which 
may prove useful also for assessing the likelihood of possible rise of 
rebellion or larger organized crime units. Like any other public bu-
reaucracy, there are internal mechanisms in the police that may stimu-
late the officers into high or low activity levels during normal, non-
conflict situations. In periods of calm, officers may remain at their po-
lice stations most of the time and therefore getting access to less in-
formation about the area they are supposed to patrol. In high gear, the 
police may investigate a large number of cases, patrol intensively and 
build up a larger knowledge base about their area of responsibility. 
Like other public bureaucracies, their low-activity levels may be tied 
to state-wide developments: insufficient tax base, inefficient or cor-
rupt disbursement of wages, severe corruption in procurement, and so 
on. Slow-moving courts may also tie the effort levels of the police 
down. 
 
But the police have a legal monopoly on violence in peacetime situa-
tions. This monopoly may easily be misused in the often hectic situa-
tions that the police are supposed to handle. Open-ended situations 
and the legal monopoly on violence make large parts of the police re-
spond to unpaid wages by increased extortion. Unlike most other pub-
lic organizations that display queue-like behaviour, corruption may 
not induce lower, but rather higher activity levels of the police. 
 
When teachers are confronted with unpaid wages they mainly with-
draw from teaching (at the same time as they try to collect some bri-
                                                 
of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya is lively described in Anderson (2005, e.g. pp. 71–
72). 
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bes from it) and their average activity level declines. The police, on 
the other hand, are likely to develop a two-pronged ‘strategy’. Some 
will intensify their monitoring of space and become more active as 
they will look out for more income-generating situations. Their envi-
ronment will present the police with more tasks as it becomes more 
violent and as the complementary, informal monitoring from schools, 
forestry officials and other parts of the public administration recede.27 
If violence increases to non-controllable levels, non-committed police 
may, however, move into their camps or stations and reduce their ac-
tivities as a response to increased danger.  
 
Organized crime units will be allowed to grow since they often are 
generous bribe payers. They may also become active competitors to 
the police, particularly if their violence capabilities are allowed to 
match those of the police. They may e.g. start providing competing 
security packages. As the public loses trust in the police, it will be 
more unwilling to cooperate with them, supplying less relevant infor-
mation. It becomes difficult even for well-intentioned policemen to 
fulfil their task of serving the public. The state loses its grip on the 
area, despite high but corrupt efforts of the police. A number of quan-
titative studies indicate that along several dimensions the police are 
the most corrupt public bureaucracy and, maybe even more impor-
tantly in this context, are considered by the public to be the most cor-
rupt in most non-rich countries (Andvig and Fjeldstad 2008).  
 
Moreover, both responses imply a de facto decentralization or frag-
mentation of police response. All in all, the effect is that the value of 
the information from the police’s scanning of their environment will 
be impaired and not useful from the point of view of the political lea-
dership. Its main interest would be whether some large-scale violent 
rebellions are to be seen on the horizon. Knowing this, many poor 
countries may invest in a small, but high quality secret police that are 
specialized in collecting information and relieved from the task of 
keeping public order.28  
 
As violent conflicts shift in intensity and scale, the role of the police 
and the police organization itself may be substantially modified. In 
many countries, the police have paramilitary divisions or are paramili-
                                                 
27  So far, we have applied the terms ’commitment’ and ’activity levels’ synonymously. This 
may sometimes be misleading. Here they diverge. Non-committed police may become 
quite active. Other fragments of public bureaucracies may have similar responses. It is, of 
course, possible to interpret activity rates outlined in the discussion around the Schellling 
diagram in a more metaphoric sense as ‘the effort level of a public official that works in 
the direction of his/ her organization’s stated purposes’.  
28  For example evaluating the post-election violence in Kenya 2007-08, the thorough Waki 
Commission (http://www.eastandard.net/downloads/Waki_Report: 278) found the spe-
cialized intelligence apparatus, Kenya Security Intelligence Machinery (KSIM), to have 
understood the situation well and made sensible advice while the regular police system-
atically had bungled in their understanding as well as in their deeds. 
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tary organizations, assigned to handle intermediate scales of conflict, 
but at the high scale end of violence, the military will have the main 
responsibility to defend the political elite against potential rebels; and 
the roles of the police will again change as it will be subject to coordi-
nation with the military and subordinated to it.  
 
In this paper, however, we are not going far in explaining the process 
and characteristics of violent conflicts, or in studying their effects on 
the state, the private economy and the rebel organizations. Only some 
of the preconditions for their emergence will be presented.  
 
Seen from the state and the military, the most important additional 
role for the police during conflicts would be to collect information that 
makes it possible to discriminate between participants, their degree of 
participation, and non-participants. Such discrimination is essential to 
discourage negative individual incentives to participate in rebellious, 
violent collective action. This is the ideal. In practice we can often ob-
serve the police’s involvement in the following action sequence: gen-
eral slowing of public sector activity – lower or unpaid wages for the 
police – police corruption – less crime solving – less cooperation with 
the public – more police brutality/corruption – more fragmented po-
lice and lower regime legitimacy – a weakened state apparatus. Both 
the motivation for and the ease in establishing clusters of rebel groups 
are likely to increase. 
 
The military, on the other hand, is often quite popular and considered 
relatively non-corrupt in peacetime. Like the police, it is assigned two 
major roles. On the one hand, it is to serve the public by protecting the 
citizens against external violent threats and outbreaks of large-scale 
violent disorder that may more or less randomly pose a risk to their 
lives and livelihoods. It is also involved in organizing massive popula-
tion transfers and the construction of improvized infrastructure in 
connection with large-scale natural disasters, i.a. by providing stricken 
areas with food supplies and vital equipment. On the other hand, the 
military is supposed to protect the political elite against large-scale, 
violently expressed discontent among the citizens, and to assist the 
elite in its competition with other country elites. Seen from the point 
of view of ordinary citizens, the military is also capable of inflicting 
considerable collective harm. 
 
From our point of view, the military is a less complex organization 
than the police. Under regular, non-conflict conditions it has little in-
teraction with the non-state environment. Hence, the scope for corrupt 
transactions is limited, and the ones that occur are not likely to trigger 
any increase in undesirable activity levels before civil war-like condi-
tions have erupted. Given the little interaction with the public, the  
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state internal mechanisms such as the ones outlined in our Schelling 
diagrams, are likely to determine effort levels in the military too. On 
the whole, military employees are likely to follow the overall rates of 
activity in the state, but with a lag due to its relative isolation. As long 
as no major unrest has evolved, no visible impact of shifting effort 
levels in the military can be observed. 
 
Like other public sectors, the activity levels and corruption rates in tax 
collection are likely to have impact on the military. As usual, in situa-
tions of slow effort and extensive corruption in the tax department 
giving rise to low or missing salaries, the lack of financial means for 
promotions and relevant equipment will give the effort levels among 
soldiers and officers a serious dip. The effect may become stronger in 
the military compared to other public organizations since the military 
is not constrained by daily incoming tasks given by the non-state envi-
ronments. Aware of the importance of the military for their own sur-
vival, the state-managing elites will , however, tend to protect the 
budgets of the military in conflict-threatened environments. Given this 
protection, its relative isolation makes it possible to shield the military 
from other forms of state-wide declines in activity. It may then stay at 
higher levels than other parts of the public apparatus.  
 
If the soldiers and officers are sufficiently hard hit by lack of finance, 
however, they may use their violence capabilities to initiate visible 
extortion schemes, such as arbitrary construction of road blocs and 
some other tactics normally employed by the police or it may exert 
less visible blackmail at the political level.29 For prospective rebels, 
predatory activities of this kind indicate state weakness. The prospects 
of any rebellion, be it military or political, would hinge upon the per-
ceived state of the military and its likely way to respond. 
9. Some remarks on regular state and non-state interactions 
The heuristic model suggested above was based on matchings internal 
to the state. Only in this case could we argue that high-activity agents 
preferred to meet other high-activity agents and low-activity agents 
other low-activity ones, where the forced complementarities of the 
transaction technology were an important part of the story. This trans-
action technology is surprisingly similar across countries. At the out-
set, we suggested that we may find similar features in many forms of 
                                                 
29  At the political level the military leadership may, like other parts of the elite, also embez-
zle large funds actively and thereby contribute to the financial squeeze of the military or-
ganizations they themselves lead. This triggers commitment problems further down. Since 
an elite is not a decision unit, it may succumb to defection where the leadership’s interests 
are undermined by the single actor’s embezzlement. Extortion by the military leadership 
is based on their (partial) control of the military instruments of violence. In coup envi-
ronments, leading military officers will be part of what Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) 
designate as the selectorate, hence they will become politicians themselves.  
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state–non-state interactions, too. Various forms of state regulation 
may enforce similar transaction technology. Student–teacher interac-
tions may be a case in point. Here we may even have increasing re-
turns: If a student is taught by a non-committed teacher, the educa-
tional output may be close to zero, as would be the outcome of meet-
ings between a committed teacher and a non-committed student. Care-
ful and fast form filling at both the private business and public official 
ends may be an advantage for both. 
 
Nonetheless, essential state non-state matchings often display a whol-
ly different structure. Taxpayers interacting with tax officials are like-
ly to prefer to pay as little as possible whether they meet a sloppy or 
eager tax official. A criminal would prefer to interact with low-
efficiency police while the crime victim would prefer the opposite, 
and so on. Where the rules sanctioned are considered legitimate, the 
general public would approve of hard-working, sanctioning officials, 
but, nevertheless, the individuals directly interacting with them would 
often prefer sloppy ones. Hard efforts in tax avoidance will imply lo-
wer efficiency in the tax collection. Here we do not have the teacher–
student complementarity either. 
  
In traditional macroeconomic theory – the classical area that studies 
economic interaction between the public and the private sector – the 
state is mainly considered exogenous and the effects studied are those 
of state action on the private sector: taxes reduce private activity; pub-
lic expenditures may increase it, or cause changes in private sector 
prices. Central banks may manipulate money stocks, exchange or in-
terest rates, but these may also be determined through interaction be-
tween private sector activity and public expenditure.  
 
By somewhat speculatively allowing systematic variation in the effort 
levels in public bureaucracies, some of the traditional economic me-
chanisms outlined for the state– private sector interaction need to be 
modified. In some cases, the regular results appear, only reinforced. 
Consider, for example, an exogenous increase in export prices for cof-
fee in a small economy where export of coffee is a major source of 
income. The income increase boosts the effort rates in public sector in 
general, including in the tax administration. The size of the uncon-
trolled, informal sector will then shrink and a secondary rise in public 
income takes place together with increased investment in the private 
coffee exporting sector. Human capital gets built faster, as will public 
infrastructure and public security. Particularly the latter will give a 
secondary boost to private investment. The implementation of what-
ever regulatory structure that is formally valid will become firmer. 
Presumably, the majority of these public rules make sense and on av-
erage contribute to the level of private output.  
State Bipolarity, Kin Organizations and Violent Collective Action  33 
A negative shock to coffee prices as well will give the opposite effect. 
The aggregate effect may become larger when the multiplier effects in 
the private market economy, are reinforced by internal effort multipli-
ers in the public sector. The state may eventually get stuck in a low 
level equilibrium position exposed to potential, violent rebellions, i.e. 
become a ‘failed’ state. That said, there are some situations where the 
covariance will be negative. For example, we know from a number of 
OECD countries that increased unemployment levels in the private 
sector may reduce the absentee rates in the public sector.  
 
Let us now move on and look at the mechanisms outlined and see how 
they may be applied as partial explanations of corruption and civil war 
phenomena. As pointed out in Andvig (2008), corruption and armed 
insurrections are very different phenomena, but they both deal with 
state–non-state interaction. And they are both connected to low-
activity, ‘failed’ state equilibriums, I will argue here. 
10. Empirical indications of effort variation 
This section will present a potpourri of observations of state behav-
iours that may indicate covariance in cross-state effort variations pre-
sent in our diagrams.  
 
Clear-cut empirical documentation of broad movements in effort lev-
els within the state bureaucracy is however not easy to come across. 
Effort levels of labour input are generally difficult to ascertain even 
when the resulting output is measurable (cf. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) 
that it rarely is in the public sector. 
 
We have already referred to work done by Evans and Rauch (1999, 
2000). Put briefly, they found (1999) that indicators of bureaucratic 
performance were most strongly influenced by what we have consid-
ered effort-inducing structural features of the bureaucracy: emphasis 
on merit, non-interference by outside agencies and long career paths. 
As indicators of bureaucratic performance they used indicators of cor-
ruption and red tape. Evans and Rauch (2000) showed that the same 
structural features had surprisingly strong positive effects on the coun-
tries’ growth rates.30  
 
If we accept that both public and private output and corruption and 
effort levels are positively associated, Blackburn et al. (2005) and Ha-
que and Kneller’s (2007) econometric results are suggestive: countries 
tend empirically to cluster around a couple of equilibriums: one with 
                                                 
30  I will return to the role of corruption in failed states. While effort levels and corruption 
propensities are empirically correlated (in a negative way), that is not so obvious from a 
theoretical point of view. I have already argued why I believe that bureaucratic effort lev-
els (and thereby public output) and private output on average covariate positively.  
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high GDP, high public investment and low corruption levels, another 
with low GDP, low public investment and high corruption levels. This 
confirms the multiple equilibrium approach to corruption directly, but 
it may also, weakly, confirm the multiple equilibrium mechanism in 
public sector effort levels outlined here. Public sector aggregate output 
is not a variable, however, since indicators of it are not available. 
  
Historically most of the state’s activities in the central planning coun-
tries were reflected in measurable output. These countries displayed a 
wide version in effort levels over time, partly giving a wide variation 
in their growth rates. While the standard judgment of the growth rates 
of the Soviet Union in the 1930s has been adjusted downwards from 
about 12% to 6% in some estimates (Easterly and Fischer 1995), the 
evidence is strong that the Soviet bureaucracy in this period and 
throughout World War II was working at high intensity levels under a 
strong incentives (positive and negative) regime.31 With basically the 
same institutional structure, the public apparatuses more or less gradu-
ally slowed down into a Hicksian equilibrium of the ‘easy life’ under 
Brezhnev with basically zero growth. 
 
An even stronger indication of measurable macro-fragility of public 
apparatuses occurred when the whole economic bureaucracy of the 
planned – Soviet Union- influenced – economies was exposed to sig-
nals that set their bureaucratic survival in doubt. While their econo-
mies still were basically ruled by public bureaucracies, production, 
that is the public bureaucracy output, declined strongly. The size of 
the GDP decline compared to its 1989 level ranged from 14% in Uz-
bekistan to 75% in Georgia (Andvig 2002: 59). On average the public 
bureaucrats now would choose low-activity levels in their economic 
interactions. The former criteria for recruitment, promotion and demo-
tions within a given frame of state organizations could not survive un-
der these circumstances and therefore broke down. The contrast to the 
high, positive growth rate experienced during the market transition 
organized by China’s party- and state bureaucracies is particularly 
striking. 
 
An even more indirect form of evidence of the effects of macro-
variation in state activity levels on economic performance has been 
present in a few recent analyses of economic growth by Jones and  
                                                 
31  The estimates of Soviet growth rates remain controversial. Sachs (2000) refers to growth 
rates in the 1930s around 8%, increasing to 9.4% in 1948-1958. A detailed description 
and analysis of the Soviet managerial incentive structure from its manic phase is found in 
Granick (1972). A literary witness may be found in Bek’s novel The New Promotion, 
published in Germany in 1971. The spirit of the times may be most succinctly expressed 
by Stalin himself in his old declaration of high incentive intensity intent: ‘to burn up cad-
res[managers] like coal.’ By killing a large number of public officials Stalin created an 
extraordinary large number of promotion slots. Hopefully, this incentive device will never 
be applied systematically again. 
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Olken. They (Jones and Olken 2005 ) first study the economic effects 
of change in top political leadership: What are the effects on the 
growth rates of unexpected deaths (sudden illness or accidents) of na-
tional leaders when in office. They found a significant change in 
growth rates before and after the event. The effects were more pro-
nounced after change in autocratic leaderships.32 A single individual 
could, of course, by himself have only minor impact. Since in most of 
the cases the private sectors are either significant or dominating, the 
impact of any central leadership individual would be through the bu-
reaucracy he/ she directs.  
 
In another paper, Olken and Jones (2008) explore internal variation of 
growth rates across time for a large number of countries. They found a 
significant variation of growth rates in most countries. Even the on 
average slowest growing countries, the ‘failures’ have had spurts of 
growth where they have become among the fastest growing in the 
world. To the degree variations in the effort levels in the public sector 
are a significant ingredient in growth variation, as shown in Evans and 
Rauch (1999), these variations are compatible with the existence of 
mechanisms that allow significant short-run effort variation in any 
‘modern’ state.  
 
An important line of research has revealed significant variations in 
effort levels of public employees measured by local variation in ab-
sentee rates among teachers and health personnel. In data from ran-
dom visits to random samples of health clinics and schools in Bangla-
desh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and Uganda, Chaudhury et al. 
(2006) found that, on average, 19% of teachers and 35% of health per-
sonnel were absent. 33Head teachers were absent more frequently than 
regular teachers, and doctors were more away than nurses. Nor had 
higher wages any impact on absentee rates, throwing further doubts 
(in addition to the fact that the higher ranked were more absent) as to 
whether any principal-agent-like mechanism were at work, at least on 
the lower levels of the hierarchy.  
 
The absentee rates were higher in regions with lower GDP levels and 
lower literacy rates. These effects were stronger in schooling than in 
health institutions. This, together with the overall higher absentee ra-
tes among personal in the latter, reflects that health personal have 
greater prospects of earning income outside their regular hours, show-
ing the impact of outside distractions on government output. The 
                                                 
32  With their indicator of leadership quality, one standard deviation improvement of leader-
ship quality causes a 2.1% increase in growth rates.  
33  Cultural or institutional factors were also likely to be influential. Indian absentee rates 
were fairly high compared to those of Uganda, particularly when taking GDP rates into 
consideration. 
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negative impact of higher absentee rates on the outcome of students’ 
learning was significant (Chaudhury et al. 2006). 
 
C. Failed states and violent collective 
action groups 
The set of characteristics of state failure so far discussed is displayed 
by the modus operandi of the state itself: The state fails by being un-
able to deliver sufficient amounts of public goods and services 
through the inaction of public officials. 
 
The existence of violent collective action groups directed against the 
political leadership of the state is a phenomenon outside the state. In 
theory, a state may be hard and fairly efficient and still have violent 
collective action groups operating on its territory. Their existence vio-
lates a core characteristic ascribed to any state, however: the monop-
oly of legitimate use of violence in a territory. If competing organiza-
tions arise that break that monopoly, they ipso facto represent a failure 
of the state according to some definitions.34 When analysing collective 
action groups, I will mainly follow standard approaches. They have 
been organized around free-riding issues (Olson 1965):  
 
Assume that all members will achieve higher utility if the collective 
action (rebellion) is implemented and succeeds, but that active partici-
pation implies substantial costs for the individual. Some of these costs 
are the same whether the action succeeds or not. The typical situation 
for this type of collective action, however, is that the expected indi-
vidual costs will be higher if the group does not succeed. This will 
only reinforce our argument in the following. But the higher utility 
associated with victory accrues whether the individual participates or 
not. Since the potential group is large, the outcome will be the same 
whether the typical individual joins or not. If he does, he has to pay 
the costs of participation. Hence, he will free-ride and not participate. 
Everyone will make the same reasoning and no collective action will 
take place.  
 
This result is obviously absurd, since voluntary, collective actions do 
take place. Nevertheless it points to some real difficulties. Moreover, 
the importance of collective action should not be confined to actual, 
empirically registered movements. As pointed out in Medina (2007: 
3–19), potential rebellious, violent collective action is probably fore-
                                                 
34  If this definition is strictly adhered to, most states will ’fail’. Parts of Harlem were for a 
long period partly outside government control. Few will define the USA as a failed state 
in that period for that reason. Like activity levels in general, the physical control of space 
will often be more or less, not either or. 
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most in any ruler’s mind, and particularly so by rulers with weak le-
gitimacy who dispose weak instruments of force. In the following I 
will outline how Olson’s dilemma may be partly circumvented in the 
context of violent action groups and how the state’s behaviour may 
impact the solutions. 
1. Free-riding and violent collective action 
The most frequently used practical solution to the free-riding dilemma 
was not much discussed by Olson: create a paid bureaucracy to serve 
the members’ interests. Thereby considerable increasing returns may 
be gained. Most efforts are made by the paid bureaucrats who are 
compensated by wages. Regular members pay only a small fee. Most 
trade unions are organized this way,35 but this practical solution does 
not solve the theoretical dilemma: Why pay the fee, if the gains made 
by the trade union’s efforts have to be shared by non-members? Mo-
reover, violent collective actions directed against the formal state may 
not in any case be left to a small bureaucracy. A large fraction of the 
members have to participate in the actual fighting. That major task 
cannot be delegated to a bureaucracy.36 
 
A second way to overcome the free-riding issue is to hand out positive 
selective incentives conditional on participation. Some are tied to the 
process of fighting itself: 
 
*  The consumer goods baskets handed out to the fighters are impor-
tant and will be handed out whether the group in the end wins or 
not. It is easy here to discriminate between participants and non-
participants.  
*  Possible allowance to loot may generate positive selective incen-
tives, but this is likely to have negative effects on the organiza-
tion’s prospects of winning the conflict. Moreover, negative selec-
tive incentives are even more typical and closely related to the vio-
lence: 
*  Even in civil wars where the loss of life among civilians is ex-
tremely high, the conditional probability of being killed is consid-
erably higher when joining a violent group than if one stays un-
committed. 
                                                 
35  Alternatively, one may regard trade unions not as any collective action group, but rather 
as a way to organize potential collective actions (strikes) and their bureaucracies as a 
costly signalling device for such actions.  
36  Most of the fighting I have in mind is taking place in areas of poverty. Violent rebel 
groups have to ensure the access of food, accommodation and clothing to its fighters. 
Hence, it is possible to consider participation in their fighting as a kind of wage contract 
and the rebel army as a bureaucracy. Only the members who support the fighting without 
receiving consumer goods baskets may then be considered voluntary members of a collec-
tive action group. 
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* Particularly for non-fighters, the members may receive strong se-
lective penalties from the authorities in areas controlled by the gov-
ernment.37  
 
Some conflicts last for so long with apparently so uncertain outcomes 
that the motivation for the violent collective action by the members 
may appear to be the process of fighting itself and the incentives it 
may yield. 
 
The free-rider issue may be circumvented by the use of force. By the 
very nature of its violent form, force can be more easily applied to mi-
tigate the free-rider problem in rebel movements than other forms of 
collective action: members may also be recruited by force since they 
may be prevented from quitting by the same instrument. 
 
The major aim of any violent contest is nevertheless to win it. A major 
motivation for joining any violent collective action voluntarily is the 
members’ assessment of the prospects of winning and of what the out-
come would be in case of victory or defeat. Regarding the prospects of 
winning, the argument is simple: If the probability of winning is low, 
it makes no sense to join. However, if the prospects are good, the free-
riding issue will reappear: 
 
Even if a victory means that my situation will improve a lot, it does 
not follow that I will join if the aim can be achieved without my par-
ticipation. Again, for me to join any violent collective action, some of 
the positive gains have to be conditioned selectively on my participa-
tion. This has to be considered against the punishment I will meet as 
conditioned on my participation in case of defeat. Gains and losses 
have to be weighed together with my assessments about the probabil-
ity of victory or defeat. That is, if my calculus is wholly based on the 
effects on myself. Naturally, as the probability of the success in-
creases, the expected, individual gain from these end-state utilities 
also increases. As the number of participants increases, the likelihood 
of winning also goes up. Given these considerations, we may draw a 
similar ‘tipping model’ diagram as figure 2, except that the variable on 
the horizontal axis now, ye , is the ‘expected fraction of the potentially 
winning violent coalition that may participate’ and on the vertical axis 
y is the ‘actual fraction that participates’:  
 
 
                                                 
37  In the Mau Mau conflict the members of the Kikuyu tribe who didn’t join the rebels, but 
joined government forces could receive high rewards in terms of land. In areas at least 
partly controlled by rebels, non-members may be the ones who receive punishment. Ka-
lyvas (2006) have studied the systematic punishment distribution hinging upon the par-
ties’ degree of physical control in the contested territories. 
Jens Chr. Andvig 40 
Figure 3. ‘Tipping’ mechanisms of violent group membership 
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The S-line indicates potential equilibrium positions where the actual 
membership rate is equal to the desired one. The solid D-line is the 
starting point for the analysis. Here the point a is the stable minimum 
level of participants in violent collective actions in the society in ques-
tion. They could either be committed enemies of the regime that will 
fight whatever, or a stable level of organized crime members. b is an 
unstable equilibrium. With expected membership below that point, the 
size of the violent group will shrink until it reaches a. With expecta-
tions above, the group will expand till it reaches c.  
 
The s-shape of the D-line is based on an assumption that the potential 
group members’ strength of motivation, or threshold for participation, 
differs but is concentrated around a typical value. The distribution of 
motivational strength may be based on different assessment of win-
ning probabilities, of expected excludable benefits across individuals 
or sub-groups during the fighting or after victory, varying degree of 
risk avoidance, different objective risk situations, different experi-
ences with state predation generating a distribution of hostility, and so 
on. The number of possibilities is large, but need not be specified at 
this stage. 38 Whatever the main motivation, it is likely that the indi-
viduals’ thresholds of participation will vary.39  
                                                 
38  While Wood (2002, appendix) emphasizes distributions of a number of emotive or other-
regarding motives, Medina (2007) focuses on individuals’ (sometimes expected) self-
regarding utilities.  
39  To assume that the distribution is bell-shaped may be rather unrealistic in a number of 
situations. For example, if the motive for violent collective action is the individual mem-
bers’ greed, a small number may operate close to a diamond mine and realize exceptional 
gains while the rest may expect more uniform gains. The distribution may then be unimo-
dal, but skewed. If it is revenge for government collective atrocities, a large number of 
distributions is possible. Generally, we should expect different groups, such as different 
tribes, or leaders and followers, to be exposed to different selective incentive and punish-
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Following Medina (2007: 136–139), it is reasonable to believe that the 
location of b will be determined by the size of selective incentives and 
punishments. The larger the selective gain of participation for the par-
ticipants in case of success is compared with the selective costs of par-
ticipation in case of failure; the closer is b to origo. Roughly put, this 
means that it is less likely that the violent group in question will un-
ravel, and more likely that it will be drawn towards its maximum size. 
If b moves to the north-east in the diagram, however, the area where 
potential revolutionary expectations will be frustrated by reality has 
increased. 
2. The interaction between the size of violent groups and 
state effort levels 
In what ways will changes in the state effort levels impact violent col-
lective action? Let us consider the high effort equilibrium of the state. 
Except in the case where the state has a clearly predatory leadership 
and applies the state’s bureaucratic efficiency for purely exploitative 
purposes, this will mean: 
 
 i)  A fairly high supply of public goods and services. This again im-
plies little may be gained for the average citizens through leader-
ship changes achieved through violent collective action if the later 
is not predatory in intent. This would impact negatively on any re-
cruitment to the collective action.40  
ii)  A higher fraction of committed state officials (particularly commit-
ted army officials) implies that the probability of winning a contest 
is lower. Hence, not only is the value of a successful contest (com-
pared to the state before the pre-rebel act) lower, the expected value 
of any gain naturally decreases when the probability of reaching it 
goes down while the expected value of any loss-connected group 
punishment increases, but to a lesser extent. 
iii) A higher fraction of committed state officials will mete out more 
precise selective punishment to active participants. If the theory of 
collective action outlined above, where we take free-rider issues se-
riously, is correct, this is an extremely important mechanism. To 
have the full motivational effect, both rewards and punishments 
should be allocated precisely between participants and non-
participants.  
 
                                                 
ment schemes, hence, to have different threshold distributions. In such cases we may get 
more complicated D-curves, for example a bimodal one with four equilibrium points.  
40  Strictly speaking, if all potential participants have only self-regarding utilities, only selec-
tive incentives, excludible utility gains achieved by the individual conditioned on his par-
ticipation, should matter. In practice, a substantial fraction of prospective members of vio-
lent collective action groups will be other-regarding. Hence, the extent of expected aggre-
gate welfare improvement will be part of the motivation and increase expected member-
ship.  
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While most selective rewards will be handed out by the collective ac-
tion group in case of success, most of the punishment will be meted 
out by the state during the fighting period whether the venture is suc-
cessful or not. To successfully discriminate, the state needs fine-
grained information. We have already seen how important a wide set 
of monitoring activities is for a state to rule an area. Like any other 
state activity, monitoring may be performed at high or low effort lev-
els. Performed at low levels, the state will be less able to mete out se-
lective punishment. If punishment is not imposed selectively, not only 
will the effect of the punishment to prevent recruitment to the violent 
collective be smaller, punishment wrongly meted out to non-
participants may stimulate recruitment of other-regarding individuals 
to the rebellion. By being unable to discriminate, harsher aggregate 
punishment may be considered necessary to make the same preventive 
effect on self-regarding potential members. The public apparatus that 
is most important for handing out selective punishment to supporters 
of the rebels is, of course, the police. 41 To fight it as a collective unit, 
the military will be the most important body.  
 
As long as the state is in high effort equilibrium, it has the capacity to 
act deliberately on its knowledge that violent group membership is 
cumulative in nature. Hence, it is likely to make substantial efforts to 
prevent it from growing and in most cases, the state will succeed. The 
potential of violent rebellion remains invisible to external observers, 
but may still be important in the political leadership’s mind. If, on the 
other hand, the state is in low effort equilibrium, but still no larger-
scale, violent collective action has arisen, the situation is different: 
While the political leadership may try to let the situation stay that 
way, it does not possess the necessary instruments. At the same time 
as the low effort equilibrium of the state apparatus stimulates forces 
that reduce the individual thresholds of participation for prospective 
members of violent collective action groups, the state loses capability 
to carry out any deliberate policy, including rebellion prevention. 
 
So far we have seen that changes in the state effort levels are likely to 
have strong impact on possible growth of violent collective action 
groups. The mechanisms sketched out in figure 2 will obviously im-
pact the ones sketched out in figure 3. Moreover, under certain condi-
tions, the state may use its knowledge about their conditions for 
growth through deliberate policy interventions.  
 
                                                 
41  International organizations and foreign powers are also likely to lack the necessary fine-
grained information and will therefore tend to operate in a similar manner as a weak state 
but for different reasons. The colonial police in Kenya were unable to locate Mau Mau 
supporters without the assistance of local informants who had strong self interests when 
identifying them. One of the consequences was that violence was meted out in a non-
discriminating fashion. 
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What about the violent action groups: Will their size and behaviour 
have impact on the state’s effort equilibrium? Here, a natural question 
to ask is whether a civil war may shake a state out of a high- into a 
low-activity equilibrium or the other way around? Or may it rather 
reinforce the entrenched, ruling equilibrium? Moreover, assuming that 
the state bipolarity theory is useful, do the rebel leadership groups 
have any instruments for deliberately moving the state into low effort 
equilibrium and hence increase their own prospects for victory? If our 
theory is correct, the last situation may rarely arise, however, since if 
the state is in high effort equilibrium, potential violent action groups 
will only be small and local and not possess any policy instruments to 
speak of in the first place, except maybe terrorist ones. 
 
The first question is then whether the threat of violent rebellion may 
move the state apparatus from a low effort to a high effort equilib-
rium. It is reasonable to hypothesize that threats against the state’s 
survival might increase the share of its employees who become com-
mitted. The effect of wars on the strength of the state has become an 
important subject in historical sociology. Based on European experi-
ence, Tilly (1992) has famously argued that the European state appa-
ratuses hardened because of a number of interstate wars. However, the 
same seems rarely to have been the outcome of the large number of 
intra-state wars that took place in the post-colonial period, although 
survival apparently was at stake here too.42 Why not? An obvious hy-
pothesis is that a substantial fraction of state officials in civil war 
situations identify with the rebel group. It then becomes difficult to 
have a sufficiently large fraction of committed officials to tip the state 
into high effort equilibrium. Moreover, unlike members of the rebel 
group, large fractions of state officials are likely to keep their posi-
tions or improve them in case of defeat. By assumption, the rate of 
task completion is low at the outset and demands smooth cooperation 
between the officials involved. With increased political differences, 
faster completion rates appear implausible.  
 
Summing up, if our model framework for catching the interaction be-
tween the state and violent rebellion is appropriate, the behaviour of 
the state appears to have significant impact on the rise in violent col-
lective action, while the effects from the behaviour of rebel groups on 
state capacities are uncertain at best. Most (among the few) cases of 
significant changes in the direction of high effort states after sustained 
periods of violent rebellions have taken place when the rebellions 
have been victorious. The most striking recent case here is Rwanda. 
                                                 
42  The civil war in China is an obvious exception. The Kuomintang state was able to create a 
committed apparatus at Taiwan after their defeat. Otherwise, it appears that when any 
post-conflict hardening has taken place it has been associated with the cases where the 
former rebel groups have conquered the state. Candidates here are Mainland China, Viet-
nam, and to a lesser degree Rwanda and Uganda. 
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Representing a minority, relatively high efficiency was a condition for 
the rebel group to be victorious. For the same reason (its minority po-
litical basis), the threat of rebellion is likely to remain an important 
part of the motivation among the present state officials to stay com-
mitted to high efforts. 
3. Kin-based links between low state effort equilibriums and 
violent collective action? 
We have looked at the effects of variation in state efficiency for possi-
ble rise in violent collective action groups. The effects worked partly 
through the welfare of citizens, partly on the prospects for a military 
victory of non-state organizations. Surprisingly, the effects went in 
one direction – from the state – and the argument appeared to be quite 
general as it did not specify any institutional structure outside the state 
and the rebel group(s). It is obvious, however, that neither organiza-
tion works in an economic or institutional vacuum. One of the clearest 
results from the econometric research of civil wars is that low 
GDP/capita increases the risk of their outbursts. We have linked this 
to low- commitment levels in the public sector, but there are of course 
many other factors at work.  
 
Until fairly recently, the prevalence of ethnic divisions was considered 
to have only minor effects on the actual triggering of civil wars ac-
cording to most quantitative studies. This result has been modified 
lately.43 Bates (2008a: 9–10) now considers ethnicity and violence as 
jointly ‘produced’ by state failure. Here I will look at some aspects of 
kin-based organizations that at one hand makes it more difficult to po-
pulate formal state organizations with a high fraction of committed 
officials and at the other hand may ease the creation of violent com-
pared to peaceful forms of collective action. Kin-based organizations 
and values are particularly prevalent in a number of African coun-
tries44, but have strong impact in most poor countries. In some, they 
may have a basis in specific ideology, but everywhere family units 
dominate primary production units, which makes it ‘natural’ to apply 
similar modes of person-based organizations in other contexts . Often 
larger scale income redistribution and informal insurance schemes and 
access to land are based on individuals’ position in kin-based nomen-
clatures. 
 
                                                 
43  The confidence researchers had in this negative result is somewhat surprising given the 
obvious lack of correspondence between the statistical indicator for ethnicity used (an old 
indicator of the number of tribal units within a country borrowed from Soviet ethnogra-
phy) and the strength of ethnic divisions.  
44  Compared to other regions, Africa has an oversupply of civil wars, about 50% of the ones 
between 1970 and 1994 [check reference, Bates 2008a?]. Alesina and Guiliano (2007: 41) 
note that the two sub-Saharan countries in their sample have the strongest expression of 
family values, as recorded in the international social value surveys.  
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A key problem with kin-based organizations and values, from the 
viewpoint of formal organizations, is that they may create divided 
loyalty. This makes it  
 
i) more difficult to create and maintain high effort equilibrium if 
status and efforts inside kin organizations become main criteria for 
hiring, firing and promotions in the public sector, supplanting merit 
and formal competence. In extreme cases, whole, large groups with 
a certain shared kin affiliation may be defined as unemployable. 
Hence, significant sources of talent remain untapped. The existence 
of working kin organizations may further 
ii)| increase the officials’ counterproductive efforts – always present as 
a possibility – inside the bureaucracies to block rivals’ accom-
plishments.  
iii) Duties owed inside kin contexts tend to increase absentee rates, 
except when the officials are serving their own kin or neighbours, 
as shown in Chauduri et al. (2006). They may also in other ways 
reduce the efforts spent inside the public organizations.  
iv) It drains the public sector of income by creating illegal transfers 
from high income employees to their kin hinterlands.45 As pointed 
out in Andvig (2006), extensive kin-based organizations and ideol-
ogy tend to go together with extensive corruption in the public sec-
tor.  
 
The prevalence of kin organizations that criss-cross the private and 
public sphere may also – at least up to a point – stimulate violent 
forms of collective action. We have already pointed out some of the 
mechanisms: 
 
a) By weakening the effort levels in the public sector it increases the 
rebel probability of winning violent contests, and therefore makes 
it easier to recruit new members. 
b) The use of kin-nomenclature simplifies the restriction of public 
goods that result from eventual victory to members of the collec-
tive action groups. When allocation to jobs in the public sector is 
heavily influenced by kinship and some kin groups are denied ac-
cess, the individual route to riches and power through public em-
ployment, with subsequent private taxation (corruption), may be 
blocked for their members. Hence, not only does the prevalence of 
kin distinctions make it easier to exclude non-participants from 
sharing the collective prize, the value of the individual prizes may 
also be larger. It will be more to gain by violent collective action by 
members of excluded kin groups. 
                                                 
45  Several interesting models that bring this behaviour into a wider context have been con-
structed by Azam, e.g. Azam (2008). 
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c) On the other hand, the government should also be able to hand out 
punishment more accurately with a publicly recognized and ob-
servable kin classification system.46 47 
d) The combination of a) and b) mitigated by c) creates links between 
kin-based organizations and the propensity to violent collective ac-
tion. There are other factors likely to favour kin-based organization 
of collective forms of violence such as established norms of recip-
rocity.48 
e) Kin-based organizations may also more easily create negative se-
lective incentives against free riding. On the other hand, the kin 
nomenclature may also make it easier for the authorities – at a 
given effort level – to punish members for active contributions se-
lectively if the nomenclature and the fighting are public and easy to 
recognize.49  
f) Compared to other potential violent action groups based on poverty 
levels or class, kin groups with an economic basis in agriculture or 
urban slum areas are naturally clustered geographically, which 
makes it easier to search forms of organization that enable geo-
graphical control, that is, organizations that may more easily apply 
violent instruments at an early stage. 50 
g) Compared to other potential violent action groups based on poverty 
levels or class, kin groups have the advantage of encompassing 
both poor and rich members. The rich may then finance the conflict 
labour of the poor and to some degree lessen the financial restraints 
on fighting that may restrain collective action groups when all the 
members are poor.51 
                                                 
46  Anderson (2005) shows that it was possible for the British to restrict punishments to 
members of the Kikuyu tribe during the Mau Mau rebellion. That, combined with the fact 
that most of the expected gains in case of victory would be restricted to members of that 
tribe, prevented any multi-tribe rebellion. That the British were unable to distinguish be-
tween supporters and non-supporters in many situations fuelled the conflict, however.  
47  Another countervailing factor is that the officials of ruling kinship coalition now may risk 
to loos their public sector jobs and may now have stronger incentives for high efforts 
choices. Why this potential hardening of the state rarely has been observed is somewhat 
puzzling, but may be due to the all the negative kinship mechanisms outlined here.  
48  Habyarimana et al. (2007) usefully classify arguments for why intra-ethnic provision of 
public goods is higher than cross-group provisions. In their experiments with respondents 
from Ugandan slum areas they found that the higher intra-ethnic ability to develop recip-
rocity, including a willingness to mete out negative sanctions, was the most effective 
mechanism, if the reciprocity was acted out in public.  
49  If the violent organization is secret and criminal, kin-based organizations may be more 
difficult to penetrate and will have an advantage on this score too, cf. well-known data 
about mafia organizations.  
50  In Europe, the working class movement only began to look for a development of geo-
graphically based working councils when the expected conflict level was extremely high 
under or just after World War I. As the working class power ebbed in 1920-21, the em-
phasis on local, geographically based power also declined ( Maier 1975: 150). Collective 
ownership to land based on kin groupings is in various ways an important source of con-
flict in a number of African countries. 
51  In a model where there are class division in each ethnic group, and class conflicts and 
ethnic conflicts are both possible, Esteban and Ray (2008) show that this is a key mecha-
nism that may make ethnic conflicts the salient ones. At the early stages, the existence of 
fairly rich supporters, such as the Koinange family, might have been important for the 
triggering of the Mau Mau rebellion – as their withdrawal might have been for its demise.  
D. Corruption, state failures and low ef-
fort equilibriums  
A violent rebellion is a violation of the core institutional rule that the 
state has a monopoly on force, including its lawful delegation. It 
comes as a direct challenge to that rule. Corruption, on the other hand, 
represents numerous breaks to a myriad of rules that agents of the sta-
te are supposed to adhere to, but which they violate (or challenge) 
when pursuing their private interests. In both cases, however, the vio-
lation may be motivated by the individuals’ private economic interests 
or by their adherence to non-state loyalties.  
 
 Both sets of behaviour may reflect related forms of state weakness 
and are included in our intuitive notions of what constitutes a state 
‘failure’. In the case of rebellion, it is the strength of the physical force 
apparatus and the state’s overall monitoring capacity that may appear 
sufficiently weak to leave it open to challenge. In the case of corrup-
tion, the monitoring apparatus may appear so weak or unreliable that 
agents expect to get away with their violations undetected or at least 
unpunished. Seen from the point of view of economic theory, they rai-
se two questions, however: Why will anyone ever join a violent rebel-
lion; why will not every public official always engage in corrupt tran-
sactions? 
 
The focus here will be on possible links between corruption and the 
state officials’ effort equilibrium. Unlike the case of the relationship 
between effort level and the rise in violent collective action groups, 
the relationship here is essentially two-way: corruption contributes to 
forces that tend to move the state into lower efforts, and low efforts 
stimulate corruption. This clearly appears to be empirically the case, 
but it is not obvious: 
 
It is possible to imagine a hard-working bureaucracy that is thor-
oughly corrupt: The potential bribe giver (the ‘client’) may be willing 
to pay an official more if he makes large efforts on his behalf. Thus, it 
may pay off to be a hard worker. Since the superior of the official in a 
corrupt state will tend to receive a large share of the corrupt proceeds, 
he will tend to employ and promote officials that collect more bribe 
income, and who, in this case, happen to be the hard-working ones. 
The lower officials, on the other hand, know that their superior col-
lects from a larger number of inferiors, and is able to amass much lar-
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ger proceeds than they are. Hence they are eager to get promoted. The 
most hard-working ones are likely to succeed in such a system. 
 
As far as I know, it has to my knowledge never been observed on a 
wider scale, however. In certain situations corruption may speed up 
specific procedures, but on average it pays to go slow in order to col-
lect, and experienced observers interpret slow-working bureaucracies 
as signalling corruption. Why this is so, again, is not so obvious. Spe-
cification of queuing models can elucidate part of the economics of 
the story (cf. Andvig 1991), but sociological mechanisms such as cor-
ruption’s ability to destruct ‘corporate coherence and esprit de corps’ 
(Evans and Rauch 1999: 750) may be even more important. After all, 
a major output of the state is to ‘produce’ and implement a set of pub-
lic rules. In addition to services like public education and health, these 
rules are the stated aim of public bureaucracies while a large fraction 
of corrupt transactions are based on the fact that citizens and enter-
prises are willing to pay public officials not to follow them. When 
done on a regular basis, these rules cease to have effect, and the state 
in fact withdraws from its arena. It fails. 
1. An example of corruption as a partial state failure 
Let us highlight the relationship between corruption, effort levels and 
the supply of public output; this time by presenting a stylized example 
instead of sketching a general model: 
 
Imagine a tropical country that needs to tax imports to finance its pub-
lic sector, so import taxes are fairly high. Unlike many other countries, 
the political leadership intends to apply the import taxes to redistribute 
income from rich to poor, and it also has some environmental and em-
ployment concerns. Hence the country fixes the tariff rate on refrig-
erators to 20% and washing machines to 40%.52 Assume that washing 
machines and refrigerators weigh about the same and are imported in 
containers that have to be opened and inspected in order to determine 
their contents. 
 
Regard an importer who ships a container of washing machines (legal 
tariff rate 40%). Against a false declaration the customs officer reclas-
sifies them as refrigerators (20%). The importer and official divide the 
proceeds so that the importer pays in fact 20% in taxes while the cus-
toms officer receives 10% as bribes, an effective tax rate of 30%. In 
this situation it is not in the interests of the customs officer to slow the 
shipment, although it will take time to negotiate the deal. But it is in 
                                                 
52  Alternatively, we may imagine the political leadership to be predatory and to reflect the 
relative power of the rich. Hence, it will prefer to tax the poor, which here would mean 
that the rates on refrigerators vs. washing machines are switched. Needless to add, that is 
what leadership in most poor countries do. 
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the interest of the custom officer(s) as well as the importer involved to 
keep the transaction as secret as possible: The overall state system of 
monitoring is weakened since the authorities will not know that a con-
tainer of undesirable washing machines is moving through their har-
bour. In addition, the state will have lost the 20% income that could 
have been spent on guns or schoolbooks.  
 
Whether the superior officer is lazy or corrupt, the corrupt transaction 
has been easier to perform if the internal monitoring system is weak. 
Here, low effort levels at the higher ranks give increased scope for 
corrupt transactions. Low effort level may in this way be said indi-
rectly to contribute in causing the corrupt transaction, while the latter 
is weakening the state’s ability to monitor its environment as well as 
its tax base and thereby, possibly, effort levels in other parts of its ap-
paratus. 
 
Let us now look at the situation where the importer has refrigerators in 
her container and is entitled to pay only 20% of the value of the goods 
in tariffs. The custom officer may still demand 10% in bribes. Now 
the effective tariff rate including bribes will be 30%. To be able to col-
lect bribes on this shipment, the customs officer will seek to delay the 
paper handling, insisting that the importer is cheating and really is im-
porting washing machines, but wants to avoid taxes. The importer and 
custom official have opposite interests in this case. The harbour will 
be clogged with refrigerators.  
 
Marginally, this corruption-induced slowing down of task completions 
in the customs contributes negatively to productivity in the private 
economy. Note, however, that while a corrupt superior in the former 
case was completely useless for the lower official’s bribe collection, 
he is now essential to extort the bribe from the importer since the lat-
ter now will try to complain.53 He needs the superior’s cooperation to 
make his threat credible: if the bribe is not paid, the goods will be re-
classified as washing machines and hence 40% tariffs have to be paid.  
 
In this case, low effort levels in the state surroundings of the corrupt 
transaction are not an active cause for the slow movement of the 
goods across the customs. Here it is the corrupt transaction itself that 
directly causes a slowing down of the effort levels in the harbour. 
More importantly, the main ‘output’ of the state’s involvement here: 
the rule that ‘import of washing machines should carry 40% and re-
                                                 
53  In practice, custom officials may need the cooperation of international shipment inspec-
tion bureaus that the country’s authorities may have hired to keep up the taxable income 
from imports. While exporters and importers may share a common interest in classifying 
goods fraudulently to minimize tariff rates, custom officials and employees may some-
times collude to move in the opposite direction. Bureau Veritas has, for example, once 
been expelled from Madagascar for engaging in illegal transactions of this kind (Razafin-
drakoto and Rimbaud, 2007). 
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frigerators 20%’, would be completely undermined by the combina-
tion of corrupt transactions in the two situations. The combination of 
extensive corruption and low effort levels at the import points has 
made the state unable to implement it. In this line of activity, the state 
has become weak. It has failed to implement its own rules.  
2. Low effort levels and corruption 
Let us now look at the broader stylized (‘ideal type’) situations of in-
teraction between corruption and effort levels in high versus low-
activity equilibriums, beginning with the low equilibrium situation.  
 
Here the rate of task completions is comparatively slow both inter-
nally and in relation to the non-state public. This implies that the offi-
cials will be less task-motivated, and sharing less work, they will 
know less about the work of the others. The rate of mutual monitoring 
between officials will be low, which will by itself facilitate corrupt 
transactions. Since the latter often will be of the first harbour kind, 
they will be difficult to detect since they will be of advantage to all 
directly involved. Colleagues and the immediate superiors will often 
be the only ones in a position to detect them. Low-activity equilib-
riums will also be characterized by few promotions, and few based on 
task completions. Hence, officials will tend to look for other strategies 
in order to improve their economic lot. Complaining importers in the 
second position will only get a slow response. In fact, the slow rate is 
a condition for corruption. 
 
As pointed out above, low rate in tax collection is an important char-
acteristic of low state activity equilibriums. Low activity in tax collec-
tion and its slow and sloppy disbursement to other parts of the public 
apparatuses make it difficult to pay officials in other government sec-
tors sufficiently high and regular wages. They again have to think 
about other ways than task completion in order to gain their income. 
Corruption in tax collection (cf. our first harbour case) and embezzle-
ment in the disbursement process, will strongly exacerbate the prob-
lem. Public officials will then have to fend for themselves. Teachers, 
nurses, and so on, will have to do their own private taxation, i.e. to 
demand bribes for their economic survival.54  
 
A public sector job becomes an unpaid licence to collect.55 To receive 
such licence payment is still needed, however. Superiors who control 
                                                 
54  It is an interesting, but unexplained fact that such tax collecting anarchies seem to gener-
ate extremely uneven distribution of income among public employees. 
55  The licence to get a job is often not free. On the contrary, an informal licence may be 
quite expensive and in the case of exceptionally profitable positions, such as many jobs in 
the customs, may constitute more than 100 times the official wages of the job in question 
(Andvig 1999). 
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the employment function may now amass considerable income 
through direct job selling and the subletting of rights to job selling, 
that is, their control of promotions.56 When capitalized this way, the 
pressure on inferiors to do the primary corrupt collection naturally in-
creases since they now have to cover the capital costs. To keep this 
structure going, the major preoccupation of the state becomes quite 
predatory; to collect as much income from the non-state citizens as 
possible. At the same time it will be effectively decentralized, or 
rather compartmentalized. Even when its very survival is threatened, 
the collective actions necessary to bring the state out of high corrup-
tion–low activity equilibriums are difficult to achieve. 
3. High-activity equilibrium and corruption rates  
Let us now take a look at the high-activity equilibrium, and its condi-
tions for the growth of corruption transactions and their potential 
feedbacks on that equilibrium. In this situation, the non-state envi-
ronment will normally feed the state with a stream of new tasks. Add-
ing those to the internally generated ones, most government officials 
are staying quite busy. That includes tax collectors, so sufficient in-
come is generated to keep wages and promotion probabilities at ac-
ceptable levels. Task motivation is widespread and sustainable.  
 
The frequent interaction during tasksolving and the high effort levels 
in the control processes make each official exposed to significant 
monitoring from the control institutions and – more importantly from 
colleagues, who often are the only agents likely to be able to know 
whether a given transaction has been corrupt or not. In particular, su-
periors and inferior officials are doing many tasks together. In this set-
ting, it becomes difficult to make potential corrupt transactions with 
the non-state environment sufficiently secret to ensure low risk com-
pletions of corrupt deals. If exposed, they are likely to be fired, and 
even suspicions may easily reduce promotion probabilities. 
 
It does not follow that no corruption is taking place in this situation. 
Some administrative bodies make decisions or possess information 
that is extremely valuable to private agents where it is very difficult to 
                                                 
56  Incidentally, this feature of job selling may also be observed in states that have not moved 
this far into a low-activity trap, but where corruption has become quite organized. Its clas-
sic description is Wade (1982) and it has been commonly observed in otherwise fairly 
well functioning countries in South Asia. One of the likely reasons for its evolvement is 
that it allows considerable transfers of corrupt income upwards at the same time as it re-
duces the risks and transaction costs for the superiors in states where there are some polic-
ing of corruption. If a higher official has to stick his hand into every corrupt transaction of 
his employees, he will be involved in a considerably larger number of corrupt transactions 
than his subordinates. Even if the risk of being caught may be small at each transaction, 
the cumulative risks for a superior will be quite high. In caste systems like India’s this job 
selling has the additional advantage that higher officials, let us say in the police, who usu-
ally are from ‘cleaner ‘castes, may avoid becoming dirty. 
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identify transactions as corrupt or not. Here, corruption arise quite fre-
quently, but mostly with limited feedback effects on activity levels 
since the high risk areas, such as building regulation and public pro-
curement, normally involve only a few public employees whose be-
haviour has limited potential for imitation by other agents in the pub-
lic sector (often only specialists within municipal bureaucracies are 
involved), but the economic values involved are substantial. Note that 
we here disregard what takes place at the political level. 
4. Shocks and co-variant shifts in corruption and effort-levels 
The extent and severity of corruption across countries vary considera-
bly. One reason is that corruption like the state’s effort levels are phe-
nomena that are likely to stick at different equilibrium levels (Andvig 
and Moene1990). For the single country, this also implies that corrup-
tion levels may move from one equilibrium level to another given the 
right kind of shock. While both are likely to be influenced by a host of 
cultural factors, partly determined outside the government appara-
tuses, it is also for that reason difficult to believe that most equilib-
rium shifts are due to sudden changes in citizens’ attitudes or values. 
It is, for example, difficult to envision that the non-state population 
would suddenly and by itself be more willing to pay bribes. Shocks 
hitting the state apparatus are a different matter.  
 
Since both the management structure and the distribution of income 
collected are centralized, the state is particularly sensitive to negative 
shocks that hit its tax collection or at the political level. Here, shocks 
may cause sudden shifts in the income and activity levels of the public 
officials. This will cause an immediate increased demand for corrupt 
income on the part of government officials, followed by a weakening 
of the monitoring structure that will eventually cause an upward shift 
in the actual corruption propensity. Typical negative shocks are: 
 
1)  In smaller, poor nations a sudden decrease in export prices may 
significantly decrease the tax base, reducing public sector’s wages 
and the number of promotion slots, shifting the officials’ attention 
away from task solving to bribe collection. Here, the number of 
jobs in the private sector will also decline, making out-migration 
from the state difficult.  
2)  Deliberate retrenchment, for example due to fiscal considerations 
or ideological shifts in a state geared towards expansion, may also 
cause a sudden decline in promotion probabilities. In addition to 
causing an exodus of state officials to relevant employment possi-
bilities in the private sector, a decline in task-directed effort levels 
combined with increased search for more or less illegal -at the job- 
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search for external economic opportunities including bribes may be 
induced.57  
3)  The centralized character of the state implies that shocks hitting or 
emitting from the top leadership may, as we have already seen, 
have significant effects on the activity levels in both the private and 
the public sector. As remarked by Bates (2008a), a centrally placed 
politician who embezzles significant parts of the state’s income, 
creates a negative shock both through the effects of the income that 
disappears and through the signal the act sends down throughout 
the hierarchies. The leadership is watched by all officials. 
 
Shocks of this kind will contribute to any observed co-variation be-
tween the effort levels and corruption rates in the public sector. Pre-
sumable the effects on effort levels should occur faster since it is eas-
ier for an official to reduce her effort level than to organize and com-
plete new sets of corrupt transactions. 
                                                 
57  Here I should add that in states with fairly strong control processes and where principal-
agent models are the most relevant ones, the opposite result would be predicted: the fear 
of losing the job could eliminate corruption like in the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model. This 
is a stronger mechanism in the first example, where the employment in both the state and 
non-state sectors is turning down. But it presupposes the existence of principals that may 
not hold when the state weakens 
E. Conclusions and summary  
Bates et al. (2002) explained state failure by means of a game where 
the violence apparatus is separated out as an acting, centrally directed 
unit. In a peaceful equilibrium, citizens spend their time on leisure and 
work, pay taxes that the military receives and make efforts to uphold 
the rule of law. If the taxes are insufficient to satisfy the specialists in 
the wielding of violence, another equilibrium results: The military will 
seek to coerce tribute from the citizens, the citizens will spend time on 
violence and refuse to pay taxes. Production will decrease, partly be-
cause more time has to be spent on violence (defensive or aggressive), 
partly because the citizens will seek to shield themselves from public 
and private sector predation.  
 
This is a ‘state failure’- equilibrium. Whether this will occur or not 
hinges upon whether it will be ‘profitable’ for the violence specialists 
to start coercive tribute collection in a peaceful situation compared to 
what they receive in regular taxes – with due consideration to the ex-
pected decline in future tributable output that will be the outcome in 
the resulting succession of violence equilibriums. 
 
The observable outcomes compatible with this game are not different 
from what we have outlined above: corruption increases and output 
declines go together with an increased propensity to violence. Large-
scale embezzlement at the political level seems an important trigger-
ing mechanism, but others are also possible. Bates et al. (2002) take 
better care of output responses from the private sector since their mo-
del, in this sense is a more genuine general equilibrium model. We do 
not specify production but simply assume that private sector produc-
tion and public sector effort levels co-vary in the aggregate due to 
dominant complementarity, so we may focus on variation in public 
sector effort levels only. 
 
The main thread of our analysis of state failure is the following. There 
are three major symptoms of state failure: Low effort (or commitment) 
levels among public employees, extensive corruption and rise in vio-
lent rebel group(s). The idea of the paper is based on an assumption of 
multiple equilibrium effort levels among public employees. Effort and 
corruption levels are co-variants, but have a causal effect on the feasi-
bility of constructing violent collective action groups through their 
effects on the probability of winning violent contests and, thereby, for 
the recruitment to violent groups. The feedbacks from these on the 
effort levels among public employees appear weak, but the potential 
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existence of strong kin-based coordination devices outside the state 
and the violent groups may connect them in different ways. I argue 
that they tend to undermine high effort equilibriums and stimulate cor-
ruption in the public sector, while in some ways ease the recruitment 
to violent groups.58 
 
In a related paper (Andvig 2010), I argue other reasons why explana-
tions of violent rebellions should take corruption phenomena into con-
sideration. The main argument here is that if one finds that rebellions 
are mainly motivated by economic profit, one must ask why the rebels 
will not seek employment in the existing public apparatus and collect 
their predatory income there? 
 
We have left many important issues related to state failure aside. We 
have, e.g., not studied the feedback impact of the fighting itself on 
preferences, on ability to mete out selective rewards in case of victory, 
and so on. Moreover, we have not discussed the political level in any 
systematic manner: Whether the country’s political system is a de-
mocracy, dictatorship or anything in between is left aside. The focus 
has been on the lower ranks.  
 
The idea is that if the public sector for one reason or another has mo-
ved into a low commitment or effort equilibrium, politicians have lost 
most of their control. Whether their intentions are good or bad, the 
outcome is almost the same: helplessness. With this helplessness, the-
re often follow detrimental economic and political outcomes for the 
population at large. We have exaggerated it here, but when the major 
tool of the population in large, complex societies for organizing regu-
lar collective action, namely the state, almost becomes useless, the 
outcome is misery. There is no one to blame. In such situations, the 
words of Indra’s daughter (August Strindberg, 1901) seem apt: ‘Life 
is evil! Men are to be pitied!’  
                                                 
58  In Andvig (2006, 2008), I study the effects of kin organizations on corruption and argue 
that we should expect them to increase corruption in most circumstances.  
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